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Not What, but When Is an Offer:   
Rehabilitating the Rolling Contract 
COLIN P. MARKS 
A number of courts have held that a contract is formed when deferred 
terms found inside the package are reviewed by the buyer and accepted by 
some act—usually use of the good.  This “rolling” contract approach has 
been widely criticized by commentators as an abomination of contract law 
that ignores a true application of the U.C.C., as well as the spirit of that 
code.  However, the approach is not without its allure, as it permits 
contracts to be formed in an efficient manner that may very well appeal to 
consumers.  Yet too strict of an adherence to the approach threatens to 
impose terms upon parties that they never expected or agreed upon; but 
conversely, too strict of an adherence to traditional concepts of offer and 
acceptance threatens to displace terms that were contemplated and not 
objectionable.  Though existing contract law does a good job of defining 
contract offer, the trickier issue is identifying when the offer is actually 
made.  If parties to a contract know that there is more to the contract than 
simply the price and the good, then it should come as no surprise that more 
terms are to come, or that a more detailed offer will be forthcoming.  Thus, 
in some scenarios, it is perfectly reasonable to assume that the contract 
has not been formed in-store, but rather a deferred offer will come later.  
Thus rolling contract theory can be explained under a legal realism 
approach, as influenced by relational contract theory; however, this is not 
to say that all contracts are now subject to the rolling contract approach.  
This Article describes how legal realism and relational contract theory can 
be used to explain the rolling contract approach and makes suggestions for 
how relational contract theory can be used to aid courts in determining 
which contracts involve a rolling or deferred offer.
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Not What, but When Is an Offer:   
Rehabilitating the Rolling Contract 
COLIN P. MARKS∗ 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
A man walks into a bar and grill.  No, this is not the beginning of a 
joke (though you may find the end of the hypothetical comical).  This is 
the beginning of a contract.  The man browses the bar’s menu and decides 
to purchase the club sandwich.  As he is in a hurry, he gets it to go.  He 
pays cash for the sandwich, which is handed to him in a bag.  When he 
finally settles down to eat the sandwich, he discovers that the cellophane 
covering the sandwich has a seal that states: 
This sandwich is sold as-is.  Any and all disputes arising out 
of the purchase of this sandwich are subject to binding 
arbitration.  By eating this sandwich, you agree to the terms 
of this agreement.  If you do not agree to the terms, you must 
return the sandwich to the seller within twenty-four hours of 
sale, and you will receive a full refund. 
The man muses briefly over the implications of this statement and then, 
overcome with hunger, eats the sandwich.  If the man gets sick from food 
poisoning, is he bound by the terms of this agreement? 
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The hypothetical is clearly fantasy,1 but it raises, albeit in a different 
context, a very typical contract problem.  To what degree are “rolling” or 
“layered” contracts binding?  Many courts have held that, with regard to 
the sale of goods, a contract is not formed in the store or over the phone, 
but at some later point.2  The typical scenario involves a good, such as a 
                                                                                                                          
1 Indeed, it is an intentional hyperbole.  As Professor Richard Epstein has noted, “It is not as 
though the green grocer is determined to contract out of a warranty of merchantable quality.”  Richard 
A. Epstein, ProCD v. Zeidenberg: Do Doctrine and Function Mix?, in CONTRACTS STORIES 94, 109 
(Douglas G. Baird ed., 2007).  The hypothetical does serve a useful purpose in this Article, however, as 
it draws out the distinction between as-if-discrete contracts and more complex contracts that 
contemplate an ongoing relationship.  Furthermore, the hypothetical may not be as far-fetched as it 
seems.  In a blog post on Contracts Prof Blog, a sign from a Texas burger franchise’s door is displayed 
which reads: 
Arbitration Notice 
By entering these premises, you hereby agree to resolve any and all disputes or 
claims of any kind whatsoever, which arise from the products, services or premises, 
by way of binding arbitration, not litigation.  No suit or action may be filed in any 
state or federal court.  Any arbitration shall be governed by the FEDERAL 
ARBITRATION ACT, and administered by the American Mediation Association. 
Arbitration Notice 
Kprofs2013, The Gates of Hell[ish Mandatory Arbitration]?, CONTRACTS PROF BLOG                              
(Jan. 11, 2011), http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/contractsprof_blog/2011/01/the-gates-of-hellish-
mandatory-arbitration.html (many thanks to Dan Barnhizer for reminding me of this link).  Some 
online merchants also seem to try to disclaim warranties with clauses that, to my knowledge,                  
have not yet appeared in stores.  See, e.g., Terms & Conditions, TARGET.COM, 
http://www.target.com/spot/terms-conditions#?lnk=fnav_t_spc_2_4 (last visited Aug. 29, 2013) 
(excluding all warranties, express or implied, for all merchandise offered on its website); Walmart.com 
Terms of Use, WALMART.COM, http://help.walmart.com/app/answers/detail/a_id/8 (last visited Aug. 29, 
2013) (same). 
2 See, e.g., Register.com, Inc. v. Verio, Inc., 356 F.3d 393, 428 (2d Cir. 2004) (noting that a 
consumer manifests assent to terms included in the shrinkwrap encasing a product not at the point of 
purchase, but instead through later actions); Hill v. Gateway 2000, Inc., 105 F.3d 1147, 1150 (7th Cir. 
1997) (“[A] vendor may propose that a contract of sale be formed, not in the store (or over the phone) 
with the payment of money or a general ‘send me the product,’ but after the customer has had a chance 
to inspect both the item and the terms.”); ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg (ProCD II), 86 F.3d 1447, 1452 
(7th Cir. 1996) (recognizing that the vendor has the power to propose a contract where the buyer 
accepts by use of the good after rendering payment for it, provided that there is an opportunity to read 
the extended terms); Meridian Project Sys., Inc. v. Hardin Constr. Co., 426 F. Supp. 2d 1101, 1107 
(E.D. Cal. 2006) (recognizing that where a consumer had notice of an end user license agreement 
(“EULA”) and an opportunity to return the software if he did not agree to the terms, the EULA was not 
invalid simply because the consumer received it after purchasing software and opening the package); 
Falbe v. Dell, Inc., No. 04-C-1425, 2004 WL 1588243, at *4 (N.D. Ill. July 14, 2004) (deciding that a 
computer purchaser manifested assent to terms and conditions inside the box by keeping the computer 
for more than thirty days); I.Lan Sys., Inc. v. Netscout Serv. Level Corp., 183 F. Supp. 2d 328, 338 (D. 
Mass. 2002) (“‘Money now, terms later’ is a practical way to form contracts.”); Brower v. Gateway 
2000, Inc., 246 A.D.2d 246, 250 (N.Y. App. Div. 1998) (“That contract . . . was formed and acceptance 
was manifested not when the order was placed but only with the retention of the merchandise beyond 
the 30 days specified in the Agreement enclosed in the shipment of merchandise.”); DeFontes v. Dell, 
Inc., 984 A.2d 1061, 1068 (R.I. 2009) (“[T]he modern trend seems to favor placing the power of 
acceptance in the hands of the buyer after he or she receives goods containing a standard form 
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computer, that is purchased in-store with no mention of additional terms or 
conditions.3  When the buyer gets home and opens the packaging, 
additional terms and conditions, such as arbitration clauses, forum 
selection clauses, limitations on liability, and the like, are discovered.4  A 
number of courts, starting with the now infamous case of ProCD, Inc. v. 
Zeidenberg (ProCD II),5 have held that, rather than the contract for the sale 
being completed in-store (or over the phone), these later terms are what 
constitute the offer, which the buyer accepts by some act—usually use of 
the good (or declining to return it).6  This approach, which has been called 
the rolling contract, has been widely criticized by commentators as an 
abomination of contract law that ignores a true application of the Uniform 
Commercial Code (U.C.C.) as well as the spirit of that code.7  Despite the 
                                                                                                                          
statement of additional terms and conditions, provided the buyer retains the power to ‘accept or return’ 
the product.”). 
3 See, e.g., Adams v. Dell Computer Corp., No. CIV A C-06-089, 2006 WL 2670969, at *1, *4 
(S.D. Tex. Sept. 18, 2006) (finding that terms delivered with a Dell computer formed a valid “right-of-
return contract,” binding the customer to an arbitration clause even after Dell agreed to pick up the 
computer and issue the customer a refund); cf. Hill, 105 F.3d at 1148 (involving the purchase of a 
computer over the telephone); Fiser v. Dell Computer Corp., 165 P.3d 328, 334 (N.M. Ct. App. 2007) 
(holding that—where a consumer purchased a computer from a website with links to terms and 
conditions, received two emails containing warnings to review terms and conditions, and received 
written terms inside the computer box—“keeping the computer after receiving the written terms and 
conditions constitutes acceptance of the terms”), rev’d on other grounds, 188 P.3d 1215 (N.M. 2008).   
4 See, e.g., Sherr v. Dell, Inc., No. 05 CV 10097(GBD), 2006 WL 2109436, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. July 
27, 2006) (“In order to avoid ineffectual, costly steps, it is not practical to expect salespeople to read 
legal documents to customers before ringing up sales.  Due to this reality, some clauses received even 
after the initial transactions are enforceable.” (citation omitted)); Mudd-Lyman Sales & Serv. Corp. v. 
United Parcel Serv., Inc., 236 F. Supp. 2d 907, 911 (N.D. Ill. 2002) (finding that a customer accepted 
terms, including limitations of liability, by breaking a shrinkwrap seal that enclosed a CD-ROM and by 
clicking “yes” to accept all of the terms prior to installation of the software); Moore v. Microsoft Corp., 
293 A.D.2d 587, 587 (N.Y. App. Div. 2002) (“[T]he defendant offered a contract that the plaintiff 
accepted by using the software after having an opportunity to read the license at leisure.  As a result, 
the plaintiff’s claims are barred by the clear disclaimers, waivers of liability, and limitations of 
remedies contained in the EULA.”). 
5 86 F.3d 1447 (7th Cir. 1996). 
6 See, e.g., Ariz. Cartridge Remfrs. Ass’n v. Lexmark Int’l, Inc., 421 F.3d 981, 987–88 (9th Cir. 
2005) (concluding that because ink cartridge purchasers had notice of restrictions on use and a chance 
to reject such restrictions “before opening the clearly marked cartridge container,” the consumer 
accepted the terms by opening the cartridge box); ProCD II, 86 F.3d at 1451 (“Notice on the outside, 
terms on the inside, and a right to return the software for a refund if the terms are unacceptable (a right 
that the license expressly extends), may be a means of doing business valuable to buyers and sellers 
alike.”); M.A. Mortenson Co. v. Timberline Software Corp., 970 P.2d 803, 809 (Wash. Ct. App. 1999) 
(“Does failure in such a case to elicit the customer’s express assent to the license terms before a 
purchase order is issued make a contract ‘unfettered by terms—so the seller has made a broad warranty 
and must pay consequential damages for any shortfalls in performance?’  We conclude that it does not 
and hold that the terms of the present license agreement are part of the contract as formed between the 
parties.” (citation omitted) (quoting ProCD II, 86 F.3d at 1452)), aff’d en banc, 998 P.2d 305 (Wash. 
2000). 
7 See Klocek v. Gateway, Inc., 104 F. Supp. 2d 1332, 1339 n.9 (D. Kan. 2000) (citing a lengthy 
list of critical commentary regarding rolling contract theory); see also Roger C. Bern, “Terms Later” 
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criticism, however, the rolling contract theory seems to have taken hold in 
a number of jurisdictions.8  The approach is not without its allure, as it 
permits contracts to be formed in an efficient manner that may very well 
appeal to consumers and merchants alike.  However, too strict of an 
adherence to the approach threatens to impose terms upon parties that they 
never expected or agreed upon.  But the opposite is also true—too strict of 
an adherence to traditional roles of offer and acceptance threatens to 
                                                                                                                          
Contracting: Bad Economics, Bad Morals, and a Bad Idea for a Uniform Law, Judge Easterbrook 
Notwithstanding, 12 J.L. & POL’Y 641, 642–43 (2004) (“[ProCD II] and its initial progeny, Hill v. 
Gateway 2000, Inc., however, have been deservedly and widely criticized, variously described as a 
‘swashbuckling tour de force that dangerously misinterprets legislation and precedent,’ a ‘real howler’ 
that is ‘dead wrong’ on its interpretation of section 2-207 of the UCC, a decision that ‘flies in the face 
of UCC policy and precedent,’ a ‘detour from traditional U.C.C. analysis’ ‘contrary to public policy,’ 
with analysis that ‘gets an ‘F’ as a law exam.’” (footnotes omitted)). 
8 See Higgs v. Auto. Warranty Corp. of Am., 134 Fed. App’x. 828, 831 (6th Cir. 2005) (“The 
‘accept-or-return’ mechanism to contract formation has been enforced by courts, including in contexts 
involving the sale of products and services by mail and telephone, software licensing and sales, mobile 
telephone service agreements, satellite television agreements, credit card agreements, and bank account 
agreements.”); Register.com, Inc. v. Verio, Inc., 356 F.3d 393, 430 (2d Cir. 2004) (recognizing rolling 
contract theory, but also recognizing its limits, as “a party must be given some opportunity to reject or 
assent to proposed terms and conditions prior to forming a contract”); ProCD II, 86 F.3d at 1452 
(initiating the formal recognition of rolling contracts); RealPage, Inc. v. EPS, Inc., 560 F. Supp. 2d 539, 
547 (E.D. Tex. 2007) (recognizing the holding in ProCD II, but distinguishing it based on the 
indefiniteness of certain clickwrap license agreements); Sherr, 2006 WL 2109436, at *2 (recognizing 
that “[a]pprove-or-return contracts have been found to be enforceable in consumer transactions,” and 
thus “some clauses received even after the initial transactions are enforceable”); Meridian Project Sys., 
Inc. v. Hardin Constr. Co., 426 F. Supp. 2d 1101, 1107 (E.D. Cal. 2006) (finding the rationale in 
ProCD II “compelling”); Chandler v. AT&T Wireless Servs., Inc., 358 F. Supp. 2d 701, 704 (S.D. Ill. 
2005) (“By using her phone rather than canceling immediately, or no later than thirty days after her 
activation date, Chandler accepted the offered services and the terms and conditions under which they 
were offered.  She had a clear mechanism and reasonable opportunity to reject them.”); Bischoff v. 
DirecTV, Inc., 180 F. Supp. 2d 1097, 1105 (C.D. Cal. 2002) (“The nature of the business in which 
DirecTV engages is similar to that of the customers in Gateway and Carnival.  Practical business 
realities make it unrealistic to expect DirecTV, or any television programming service provider for that 
matter, to negotiate all of the terms of their customer contracts, including arbitration provisions, with 
each customer before initiating service.”); I.Lan Sys., Inc. v. Netscout Serv. Level Corp., 183 F. Supp. 
2d 328, 338 (D. Mass. 2002) (“[T]he Court agrees with those cases embracing the theory of ProCD.”); 
DeFontes v. Dell, Inc., 984 A.2d 1061, 1071 (R.I. 2009) (“[W]e are satisfied that the ProCD line of 
cases is better reasoned and more consistent with contemporary consumer transactions.”); Moore, 293 
A.D.2d at 587 (determining that the use of software after having an opportunity to read extended terms, 
rather than the sale of the software in store, marked the formation of a contract); In re AdvancePCS 
Health L.P., 172 S.W.3d 603, 608 n.8 (Tex. 2005) (determining that pharmacies that continued to use a 
provider network after having an opportunity to read the terms of an associated agreement effectively 
accepted the terms); M.A. Mortenson Co., 970 P.2d at 809 (finding that the installation and use of 
software manifested assent to terms of a license); see also Stenzel v. Dell, Inc., 870 A.2d 133, 140 (Me. 
2005) (applying Texas law to enforce an agreement, which included an arbitration clause, because the 
customers accepted delivery of the computer without returning it as outlined in the agreement).  But see 
John E. Murray, Jr., The Dubious Status of the Rolling Contract Formation Theory, 50 DUQ. L. REV. 
35, 36 (2012) (“The majority of jurisdictions have not had the opportunity to decide the fate of the 
rolling theory.  It is important to pursue a definitive analysis to facilitate future decisions concerning its 
application or rejection.”). 
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displace terms that were contemplated and not objectionable to the 
consumer.  Both approaches, therefore, implicate freedom of contract.  
Thus, rather than relegating the rolling contract approach to a dark corner 
of contract law in favor of a more traditional approach, this Article 
proposes that the rolling contract should be rehabilitated.9 
But before discussing the rehabilitation of rolling contracts, a basic 
question must be addressed.  It has been noted that whether consumers 
receive the terms of a contract before or after they receive the goods is 
irrelevant because they do not read them in either case.10  Therefore, why 
should it matter when the terms are received if no one is going to read 
them anyway?  The answer can perhaps be best framed as a further 
question—if it is true that these terms are never read, what is the point in 
sending them at all?  Why not simply save the time and money of printing 
off terms or even having to host such terms on a website?  The answer is 
assent.11  It is a basic premise of contract law that you cannot be bound by 
contract terms of which you are unaware (though you may be bound by 
terms which you are put on notice of, and had an opportunity to review12— 
thus resulting in “blanket assent”).13  This strikes at the very heart of the 
                                                                                                                          
9 Rehabilitate means to restore the good name or to “restore . . . to a condition of health               
or useful and constructive activity.”  Rehabilitate, M-W.COM, http://www.merriam-
webster.com/dictionary/rehabilitate (last visited June 29, 2013).  Given that many have abhorred the 
rolling contract approach from its inception, perhaps “habilitate” is a more accurate description.  See 
Habilitate, M-W.COM, http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/habilitate (last visited June 29, 
2013) (defining habilitate as “to make fit or capable (as for functioning in society)”). 
10 Clayton P. Gillette, Rolling Contracts as an Agency Problem, 2004 WIS. L. REV. 679, 682; see 
also Omri Ben-Shahar & Carl E. Schneider, The Failure of Mandated Disclosure, 159 U. PA. L. REV. 
647, 671 (2011) (“[S]ome direct as well as indirect evidence suggests that almost no consumers read 
boilerplate, even when it is fully and conspicuously disclosed.”). 
11 See JOSEPH M. PERILLO, CALAMARI AND PERILLO ON CONTRACTS § 2.1 (6th ed. 2009) 
(“Usually, an essential prerequisite to the formation of a contract is an agreement—a mutual 
manifestation of assent to the same terms.”); Nancy S. Kim, Contract’s Adaptation and the Online 
Bargain, 79 U. CIN. L. REV. 1327, 1345 (2011) (“Both assent and consideration are essential to contract 
formation.”). 
12 See 17 C.J.S. Contracts § 36 (2013) (“An essential prerequisite to the creation of a contract is a 
manifestation of mutual assent which must be gathered from the words or acts of the parties, and the 
secret intention of one who so acts as to appear to assent is of no consequence.  A manifestation of 
mutual assent is an essential prerequisite to the creation of a contract.  The apparent mutual assent, 
essential to the formation of a contract, must be gathered from the language employed by the parties, or 
manifested by their words or acts, and it may be manifested wholly or partly by written or spoken 
words or by other acts or conduct.” (footnotes omitted)); Jean Braucher, Delayed Disclosure in 
Consumer E-Commerce as an Unfair and Deceptive Practice, 46 WAYNE L. REV. 1805, 1811 (2000) 
(noting that timely disclosure is required as a matter of general contract law). 
13 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 211 cmt. c (1981) (“Standardized agreements 
are commonly prepared by one party.  The customer assents to a few terms, typically inserted in blanks 
on the printed form, and gives blanket assent to the type of transaction embodied in the standard 
form.”); see also KARL N. LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION: DECIDING APPEALS 370 
(1960) (defining “blanket assent” as “any not unreasonable or indecent terms the seller may have on his 
form, which do not alter or eviscerate the reasonable meaning of the dickered terms”); Robert A. 
Hillman, Rolling Contracts, 71 FORDHAM L. REV. 743, 750 (2002) (“Llewellyn’s conception of 
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rolling contract problem.14  To what degree does rolling contract theory 
align with our conceptions of classical assent as viewed under the 
constructs of the offer and acceptance model? 
This Article seeks to address the question and explain the rolling 
contract theory, though the source of the explanation may be somewhat 
unexpected.  Existing contract law does a good job of defining contract 
offers.15  The trickier issue, particularly when a transaction involves an 
initial oral component, is identifying when the offer is actually made.16  In 
other words, to go back to our man in the bar—when is it fair to say that he 
made the offer in the bar (which was accepted when the bar took his 
money), and when is it fair to say that the bar interaction was nothing more 
than a preliminary event to the actual offer (which was the writing affixed 
to the sandwich)?  While many scholars have argued vehemently against 
the latter approach,17 in light of what courts are doing, it appears the more 
rational course is to now explain when this approach may or may not be 
acceptable.  When should the offer be at the point of contact (in-store), and 
when should it be on a rolling basis?  Legal realism, which was a 
foundational principle driving the drafting of the Restatement (Second) of 
Contracts, as well as the U.C.C., may offer some insights about how to 
approach the rolling contract theory.18  But so may a more recent approach 
to contract law—the relational contract approach.19  Relational contract 
theory, which essentially treats contracts as ongoing relationships rather 
than isolated events, provides a useful way of making this determination.20 
Legal realism, also called neo-classicism, abandons contract law as a 
rigid set of rules in favor of a softer approach that tries to understand how 
                                                                                                                          
‘blanket assent’ is better read to mean only that, despite failing to read form contracts, users 
comprehend the existence of standard terms and agree to bind themselves to them, provided the terms 
are not unreasonable.”). 
14 See Alan M. White & Cathy Lesser Mansfield, Literacy and Contract, 13 STAN. L. & POL’Y 
REV. 233, 250 (2002) (“[T]he essential issue raised by modern consumer contracts is one of assent.”). 
15 See U.C.C. § 1-103(b) (2011) (incorporating the common law to supplement U.C.C. provisions, 
and thereby following the common law definition of “offer”); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS 
§ 24 (“An offer is the manifestation of willingness to enter into a bargain, so made as to justify another 
person in understanding that his assent to that bargain is invited and will conclude it.”). 
16 See Eric A. Posner, ProCD v. Zeidenberg and Cognitive Overload in Contractual Bargaining, 
77 U. CHI. L. REV. 1181, 1184–89 (2010) (discussing the nature of the offer under Judge Easterbrook’s 
analysis in ProCD II). 
17 See Bern, supra note 7, at 642 (addressing the widespread criticism of rolling contracts among 
legal scholars). 
18 See John E. Murray, Jr., Contract Theories and the Rise of Neoformalism, 71 FORDHAM L. 
REV. 869, 870, 879–82 (2002) (delving into legal realism and its influence behind the U.C.C. and 
Restatement (Second) of Contracts). 
19 See id. at 877–78 (explaining relational contract theory). 
20 See id. at 877 (“Instead of the discrete or static transaction underlying classical contract theory, 
[Professor Ian] Macneil recognized contract relationships that extend far beyond the original offer and 
acceptance and insisted that contract rights and duties should be determined within the overall context 
of continuing relationships.”). 
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contracts work in the real world.21  Legal realism is at the heart of 
provisions such as U.C.C. section 2-207’s battle of the forms, which 
departed from the common law’s mirror image rule approach to offers and 
counter-offers.22  However, the rules set forth in the U.C.C. and 
Restatement do a poor job of providing guidance as to the question posed 
in the previous paragraph.  Relational contract theory has its roots in the 
writings of Ian Macneil,23 who believed most contracts were rarely, if ever, 
fully thought-out and expressed representations of the parties’ 
obligations.24  It would therefore seem to be a logical extension of both 
legal realism and relational contract theory that certain situations exist 
where the parties expect that a contract has not been fully formed in the 
store and that further terms, i.e., the formal “offer,” will come later.25  It is 
this very flexibility that helps explain the rolling contract, which should 
perhaps more accurately be described as a deferred offer.26  If parties to a 
contract know that there is more to the contract than simply the price and 
the good, then it should come as no surprise that more terms are to follow 
or that a more detailed offer will be forthcoming.27  In some scenarios, it is 
perfectly reasonable to assume that the contract has not been formed in-
store, but rather a deferred offer will come later.28  Thus, rolling contract 
theory can be explained under a legal realism approach, as influenced by a 
relational approach; however, this is not to say that all contracts are now 
subject to the rolling contract theory.  As this Article explains, some 
contracts really are formed at the point of contact under a relational 
                                                                                                                          
21 See id. at 886 (“[Neoclassicists] recognize existing rules as neither rigid nor fixed, but pliable 
and sometimes entirely outmoded.  Unlike other theorists, however, they suggest productive changes in 
contract law ranging from modifications to new doctrinal paradigms constituting workable solutions 
that courts can understand and use.”). 
22 See U.C.C. § 2-207 (2011) (“A definite and seasonable expression of acceptance . . . operates as 
an acceptance even though it states terms additional to or different from those offered or agreed upon, 
unless acceptance is expressly made conditional on assent to the additional or different terms.”); see 
also Murray, supra note 18, at 902–05 (providing background information regarding the drafting of 
section 2-207). 
23 See Ian R. Macneil, Relational Contract Theory: Challenges and Queries, 94 NW. U. L. REV. 
877, 877 (2000) (clarifying and expanding his nearly forty years worth of work regarding relational 
contracts). 
24 See id. at 878 (defining contracts as “exchange relations” rather than “specific transactions, 
specific agreements, specific promises, specific exchanges, and the like”). 
25 See Murray, supra note 18, at 877 (“While neoclassicists see relational concepts as desirable 
elaborations of neoclassical theory, relationists see neoclassical theory as a subset of an ‘overarching 
relational legal approach.’” (quoting Macneil, supra note 23, at 907)). 
26 See Posner, supra note 16, at 1184–89 (evaluating offers in rolling contracts). 
27 See Randy E. Barnett, The Sound of Silence: Default Rules and Contractual Consent, 78 VA. L. 
REV. 821, 906–08 (1992) (discussing the common sense expectations of parties). 
28 See Stephen E. Friedman, Improving the Rolling Contract, 56 AM. U. L. REV. 1, 43–45 (2006) 
(analyzing the application of the reasonable expectations doctrine to rolling contracts). 
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contract approach.29  The challenge to the courts is to determine which will 
be which.  Thus far, courts have done a poor job of doing more than 
applying the rolling contract approach to any number of situations with 
little explanation as to why it was appropriate under the circumstances to 
do so.30  Furthermore, even under a rolling contract approach, such 
contracts formed should still be susceptible to contract acceptance 
limitations, such as the general rule that a contract cannot be formed by 
silence or inaction,31 as well as to defenses, such as unconscionability.32  
Indeed, the very fact that a contract is formed as a rolling contract—where 
the offer can only be rejected after the goods have been received—should 
trigger a higher level of scrutiny under a procedural unconscionability 
claim than would a simple contract of adhesion.33 
Part II of this Article explains contract formation under both the 
U.C.C. and common law with a special emphasis on the battle of the forms 
provision of U.C.C. section 2-207.  Part III explains how cases such as 
ProCD II and its progeny have grappled with, and in some ways 
misunderstood, the U.C.C. to reach the conclusion that rolling contracts 
exist and are valid.  Part IV addresses the weaknesses in the rolling 
contract approach and, to a degree, rehabilitates this approach.  Part V then 
describes how legal realism and the relational contract theory can be used 
to explain the rolling contract approach and makes suggestions for how 
this relational contract theory can be used to aid courts in determining 
which contracts involve a rolling or deferred offer.  Part VI concludes that 
though rolling contracts may be appropriate in some situations, there are 
still limits on this approach, and it should be carefully scrutinized given the 
way in which the offer was delivered. 
II.  CONTRACT FORMATION UNDER THE U.C.C. AND COMMON LAW 
Before delving into the rolling contract approach, it is important to 
                                                                                                                          
29 See Macneil, supra note 23, at 881 (“A relational contract theory may be defined as any theory 
based on the following four core propositions: First, every transaction is embedded in complex 
relations.  Second, understanding any transaction requires understanding all essential elements of its 
enveloping relations.  Third, effective analysis of any transaction requires recognition and 
consideration of all essential elements of its enveloping relations that might affect the transaction 
significantly.  Fourth, combined contextual analysis of relations and transactions is more efficient and 
produces a more complete and sure final analytical product than does commencing with non-contextual 
analysis of transactions.” (footnotes omitted)). 
30 See infra note 152. 
31 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 69 (1981) (limiting the circumstances in which 
silence and inaction operate as an acceptance). 
32 See Friedman, supra note 28, at 35–36 (discussing unconscionability in the rolling contract 
context). 
33 See, e.g., Lima v. Gateway, Inc., 886 F. Supp. 2d 1170, 1182 (C.D. Cal. 2012) (listing several 
factors that made an arbitration provision “procedurally unconscionable to a high degree” in a rolling 
contract context). 
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review the basics of offer and acceptance under both the common law and 
the U.C.C., as well as highlight how the U.C.C. departs from the common 
law in some key areas.  This background is necessary to understand how 
the rolling contract departs from what some may deem a more traditional 
approach to contract formation.  However, a basic understanding is also 
necessary in order to explain how the rolling contract approach can exist 
without contradicting existing contract rules. 
A.  Offer and Acceptance Under the U.C.C. and Common Law 
The Restatement defines an offer as “the manifestation of willingness 
to enter into a bargain, so made as to justify another person in 
understanding that his assent to that bargain is invited and will conclude 
it.”34  The U.C.C., which applies only to the sale of goods, does not contain 
a definition of “offer,” but by virtue of section 1-103 it incorporates the 
common law to supplement its provisions.35  Thus, an offer is defined 
similarly under both the common law and the U.C.C.  The U.C.C. also 
defines “acceptance” in terms very similar to the Restatement.36  Section 2-
206 provides: “Unless otherwise unambiguously indicated by the language 
or circumstances . . . an offer to make a contract shall be construed as 
inviting acceptance in any manner and by any medium reasonable in the 
circumstances.”37  The Restatement provides: “Acceptance of an offer is a 
manifestation of assent to the terms thereof made by the offeree in a 
manner invited or required by the offer.”38  Furthermore, as to contract 
formation in general, the U.C.C. articulates a broad conception of when 
and how a contract may be formed under section 2-204, which states: 
(1) A contract for sale of goods may be made in any manner 
sufficient to show agreement, including conduct by both 
parties which recognizes the existence of such a contract. 
(2) An agreement sufficient to constitute a contract for sale 
may be found even though the moment of its making is 
undetermined. 
                                                                                                                          
34 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 24. 
35 See U.C.C. § 1-103(b) (2011) (“Unless displaced by the particular provisions of [the Uniform 
Commercial Code], the principles of law and equity, including the law merchant and the law relative to 
capacity to contract, principal and agent, estoppel, fraud, misrepresentation, duress, coercion, mistake, 
bankruptcy, and other validating or invalidating cause supplement its provisions.” (alteration in 
original)). 
36 Compare id. § 2-206 (defining “acceptance” in terms of a sale of goods), with RESTATEMENT 
(SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 50 (defining “acceptance” as an assent to terms made by the offeree). 
37 U.C.C. § 2-206(1)(a). 
38 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 50(1).  Section 50 also states: “Acceptance by 
performance requires that at least part of what the offer requests be performed or tendered and includes 
acceptance by a performance which operates as a return promise.”  Id. § 50(2). 
 84 CONNECTICUT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 46:73 
(3) Even though one or more terms are left open a contract 
for sale does not fail for indefiniteness if the parties have 
intended to make a contract and there is a reasonably certain 
basis for giving an appropriate remedy.39 
This last provision reflects the strong influence of the legal realism 
movement on the drafting of the U.C.C. and encourages a less rigid 
approach to contract formation. 
One area that has caused some confusion regarding offers involves 
advertisements.  For instance, when a consumer walks into a store and sees 
a price listed on a hammer, is the price an offer or merely a solicitation?  
The U.C.C. provides no guidance on this issue, but the Restatement 
provides that “[a] manifestation of willingness to enter into a bargain is not 
an offer if the person to whom it is addressed knows or has reason to know 
that the person making it does not intend to conclude a bargain until he has 
made a further manifestation of assent.”40  Corbin has added:  
It is quite possible to make a definite and operative offer to 
buy or sell goods by advertisement, in a newspaper, by a 
handbill, a catalog or circular or on a placard in a store 
window.  It is not customary to do this, however; and the 
presumption is the other way.  Usually, neither the advertiser 
nor the reader of the notice understands that the reader is 
empowered to close the deal without further expression by 
the advertiser.  Such advertisements are understood to be 
mere requests to consider and examine and negotiate; and no 
one can reasonably regard them otherwise unless the 
circumstances are exceptional and the words used are very 
plain and clear.41 
It appears that the presumption is that an advertisement, or listed price 
in-store or in a catalog, is not an offer but a solicitation.42  The offer must 
therefore come later—either when the consumer tenders cash, which could 
mean the offer is accepted when the money is accepted, or the offer could 
occur when the sales clerk announces the price, which could mean it is 
accepted when the money is tendered.43  The offer and acceptance could 
                                                                                                                          
39 U.C.C. § 2-204. 
40 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 26. 
41 1 ARTHUR L. CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 2.4 (Joseph M. Perillo ed., Mathew Bender & 
Co. rev. ed. 2013), available at LEXIS. 
42 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 26 cmt. b (“Advertisements of goods by 
display, sign, handbill, newspaper, radio or television are not ordinarily intended or understood as 
offers to sell.”); CORBIN, supra note 41, § 2.4 (stating that it is “not customary” to make an offer 
through an advertisement). 
43 See U.C.C. § 2-204(1) (“A contract for sale of goods may be made in any manner sufficient to 
show agreement, including conduct by both parties which recognizes the existence of such a 
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occur in some other manner as well, but it is probably safe to say that once 
the consumer leaves with the hammer, a contract has been formed.44 
The U.C.C. breaks from the common law in one important aspect 
under section 2-206 with regard to orders for prompt shipment of goods.  If 
an offer asks for the prompt or current shipment of goods, the offeree may 
accept by tendering conforming or nonconforming goods.45  This breaks 
from the common law, which would view the tender of nonconforming 
goods as a counter-offer that could be accepted or rejected by the original 
offeror.46  The effect of section 2-206 is that a seller tendering 
nonconforming goods has accepted the offer and breached all in the same 
action.47  Section 2-206 provides that to avoid this result, the seller must 
seasonably notify that the shipment of the nonconforming goods is meant 
as an accommodation.48  If the seller does so, the shipment will, in fact, be 
a counter-offer.49 
B.  The “Battle of the Forms” and Confirmations 
Though section 2-206 provides a break from the common law, section 
2-207 provides perhaps one of the greatest examples of how the U.C.C. 
altered the results of common law offer and acceptance.50  Section 2-207, 
                                                                                                                          
contract.”); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 24 (defining an offer as “the manifestation of 
willingness to enter into a bargain, so made as to justify another person in understanding that his assent 
to that bargain is invited and will conclude it”).  The tendering of cash or the announcement of the price 
could both qualify as an offer under this standard.  Determining what qualifies as the offer depends on 
what is reasonable under the circumstances, which of course can lead to incongruous results in cases.  
See PERILLO, supra note 11, § 2.6(g) (“[T]he test is whether a reasonable person in the position of the 
plaintiff would conclude that the defendant had made a commitment.  Under such a test, it is not 
surprising to find that there are often differences of opinion as to the correct result in a concrete case.”). 
44 See U.C.C. § 2-204(2) (“An agreement sufficient to constitute a contract for sale may be found 
even though the moment of its making is undetermined.”). 
45 See id. § 2-206(1)(b) (“[A]n order or other offer to buy goods for prompt or current shipment 
shall be construed as inviting acceptance either by a prompt promise to ship or by the prompt or current 
shipment of conforming or non-conforming goods.”). 
46 See 1 E. ALLEN FARNSWORTH, FARNSWORTH ON CONTRACTS § 3.21, at 315 (3d ed. 2004) (“An 
attempt to add to or change the terms of the offer turns the offeree’s response from an acceptance into a 
counteroffer and a rejection of the offer.”). 
47 See U.C.C. § 2-206 cmt. 4 (“Such a non-conforming shipment is normally to be understood as 
intended to close the bargain, even though it proves to have been at the same time a breach.”).  
48 See id. § 2-206(1)(b) (“[S]uch a shipment of non-conforming goods does not constitute an 
acceptance if the seller seasonably notifies the buyer that the shipment is offered only as an 
accommodation to the buyer.”). 
49 See id. § 2-206 cmt. 4 (explaining that notification to the buyer that the non-conforming goods 
are offered merely as an accommodation avoids such notification or shipment of the non-conforming 
goods from being the acceptance). 
50 See Colin P. Marks, The Limits of Limiting Liability in the Battle of the Forms: U.C.C. Section 
2-207 and the “Material Alteration” Inquiry, 33 PEPP. L. REV. 501, 510 (2006) (noting that, under 
U.C.C. section 2-207, “the rigid common law ‘mirror image rule’ has given way to a more realistic 
approach to contract formation”); John E. Murray, Jr., The Definitive “Battle of the Forms”: Chaos 
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also known as the “Battle of the Forms” provision, applies in two 
situations.  The first situation occurs when there is an oral or written offer 
and an acceptance that varies the terms of the offer.51  Under the common 
law, the purported acceptance, which varies the terms of the offer, would 
be deemed a counter-offer.52  This was known as the “mirror-image” rule, 
meaning that an acceptance must mirror the offer or result in a counter-
offer.53  However, because in real life, buyers and sellers frequently 
exchanged forms with boilerplate terms that no one read, to apply the 
common law would mean that the party that sent the last form would have 
the contract on his or her terms.54  The drafters of the U.C.C., heavily 
influenced by the legal realism movement, saw this as an absurdity.55  
Therefore, to avoid application of this “last shot” doctrine whereby the last 
form won, the U.C.C. permits an acceptance that varies or adds terms to 
the offer to still act as an acceptance so long as the acceptance is “definite 
and seasonable.”56 
Section 2-207(2) then addresses what to do with the additional terms.57 
The general rule is that they are proposals for addition to the contract, and 
as between non-merchants, or as between a merchant and a non-merchant, 
section 2-207(2) leaves it at that.58  This scant line has generally been 
accepted to mean that these additional terms become a part of the contract 
                                                                                                                          
Revisited, 20 J.L. & COM. 1, 2–3 (2000) (noting that U.C.C. section 2-207 was designed to break from 
the common law to end the injustice created from the “mirror-image” rule and “last shot” doctrine). 
51 U.C.C. § 2-207. 
52 See Hollywood Fantasy Corp. v. Gabor, 151 F.3d 203, 208 (5th Cir. 1998) (“Under this ‘mirror 
image’ rule, a modification of an offer qualifies as a rejection and counteroffer only if the modification 
is ‘material.’”). 
53 See Murray, supra note 50, at 2 (“The common law ‘mirror-image’ rule requires the acceptance 
to match the terms of the offer.  Where a response to an offer contains different or additional terms in 
boilerplate clauses, the mirror-image rule insists that the response must be a ‘conditional acceptance,’ 
i.e., a counteroffer, even though it reasonably appears to be a definite expression of acceptance.”). 
54 See Step-Saver Data Sys., Inc. v. Wyse Tech., 939 F.2d 91, 99 (3d Cir. 1991) (“If the offeror 
proceeded with the contract despite the differing terms of the supposed acceptance, he would, by his 
performance, constructively accept the terms of the ‘counteroffer’, and be bound by its terms.  As a 
result of these rules, the terms of the party who sent the last form, typically the seller, would become 
the terms of the parties’s [sic] contract.”). 
55 See Murray, supra note 50, at 3 (“The seller, however, ships the goods which the buyer accepts, 
thereby unwittingly accepting the seller’s terms in the counteroffer that had been fired as the ‘last shot’ 
in the battle.  Though the buyer is unfairly surprised to learn that the contract contains the seller’s 
terms, this is the result ordained under the ‘last shot’ principle.  Section 2-207 was designed to remedy 
this injustice.”). 
56 See U.C.C. § 2-207(1) (“A definite and seasonable expression of acceptance . . . operates as an 
acceptance even though it states terms additional to or different from those offered or agreed upon, 
unless acceptance is expressly made conditional on assent to the additional or different terms.”). 
57 See id. § 2-207(2) (addressing what becomes of the additional terms in the contract formed 
under section 2-207(1)). 
58 See id. (“The additional terms are to be construed as proposals for addition to the contract.”). 
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only if the offeror expressly consents to the terms.59  However, as between 
merchants, the rule is that the additional terms become a part of the 
contract unless one of three conditions are met: “(a) the offer expressly 
limits acceptance to the terms of the offer; (b) they materially alter it; or (c) 
notification of objection to them has already been given or is given within 
a reasonable time after notice of them is received.”60 
Though section 2-207 addresses how to treat additional terms under 
section 2-207(2), a method of how to deal with terms that vary the terms of 
the offer is nowhere to be found.61  With regard to situations that involve a 
non-merchant, the general rule apparently still applies, and such variations 
will become a part of the contract only if the offeror expressly assents to 
them.62  With regard to transactions between merchants, the rules get 
trickier with a number of jurisdictions adopting a “knock-out” rule, 
whereby the conflicting terms are each removed and the court fills the gaps 
made by the knocked-out terms.63 
If an offeree wishes to avoid application of section 2-207(2), he or she 
may make the acceptance expressly conditional on the terms of the 
acceptance.64  An acceptance that does so is not an acceptance under 
section 2-207(1); however, the acceptance does not qualify as a true 
counter-offer either.65  Instead, by operation of section 2-207(3), the court 
must look to whether the parties carried on as if there was a contract.66  If 
so, then a contract is formed, but only on the terms which match up 
                                                                                                                          
59 See Murray, supra note 50, at 7–8 (addressing the effect of section 2-207 in merchant and non-
merchant situations). 
60 U.C.C. § 2-207(2). 
61 See id. § 2-207 (failing to address what becomes of different terms in the contract formed under 
2-207(1)). 
62 See Murray, supra note 50, at 7–8 (discussing how section 2-207 applies to both merchants and 
non-merchants). 
63 See, e.g., Daitom, Inc. v. Pennwalt Corp., 741 F.2d 1569, 1579 (10th Cir. 1984) (“The . . . 
preferable approach, which is commonly called the ‘knock-out’ rule, is that the conflicting terms cancel 
one another.  Under this view the offeree’s form is treated only as an acceptance of the terms in the 
offeror’s form which did not conflict.  The ultimate contract, then, includes those non-conflicting terms 
and any other terms supplied by the U.C.C., including terms incorporated by course of performance 
(§ 2-208), course of dealing (§ 1-205), usage of trade (§ 1-205), and other ‘gap fillers’ or ‘off-the-rack’ 
terms (e.g., implied warranty of fitness for particular purpose, § 2-315).”). 
64 See U.C.C. § 2-207(1) (“A definite and seasonable expression of acceptance or a written 
confirmation which is sent within a reasonable time operates as an acceptance even though it states 
terms additional to or different from those offered or agreed upon, unless acceptance is expressly made 
conditional on assent to the additional or different terms.” (emphasis added)). 
65 See id. § 2-207(3) (addressing the effect of both parties’ conduct, which recognizes a contract 
though a contract was not truly formed). 
66 See id. (“Conduct by both parties which recognizes the existence of a contract is sufficient to 
establish a contract for sale although the writings of the parties do not otherwise establish a contract.”). 
 88 CONNECTICUT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 46:73 
between the offer and acceptance.67  Thus, additional and different terms in 
the purported acceptance would again fall away, and the court would be 
left to gap-fill.68 
The above description lays out the first situation that section 2-207 was 
intended to address—an offer with an acceptance that varies or adds to the 
non-core terms (or the traditional “battle of the forms”).  The section also 
rather awkwardly addresses a second situation: confirmations.69  Section 2-
207(1) by its terms applies to a “definite and seasonable expression of 
acceptance or a written confirmation.”70  Thus, if a contract is formed 
orally, either over the phone or in person, and one of the parties later sends 
a written confirmation, any additional or varied terms in the writing will be 
subject to section 2-207.71  As to a transaction that involves non-merchants, 
the same result should apply as above.72  The additional and different terms 
are simply proposals, which can be ignored by the other party, and they do 
not become a part of the contract unless both parties expressly assent to 
them.73  As between merchants, again the nature of the terms will be an 
issue with additional terms being subject to section 2-207(2)(a)–(c).74 
C.  Application of the “Battle of the Forms” to a Typical In-Store 
Transaction 
With these basics in mind, let us return to the sandwich hypothetical 
from the introduction.  When the man walks into the bar and sees the 
menu, most courts would agree that the menu is a solicitation rather than 
an offer.75  When the man places his order, this is most likely the offer, 
which the bar accepts either when it takes his money or at the very least 
                                                                                                                          
67 See id. (“In such case the terms of the particular contract consist of those terms on which the 
writings of the parties agree, together with any supplementary terms incorporated under any other 
provisions of this Act.”). 
68 See id. (stating that “supplementary terms” from other U.C.C. provisions may be incorporated 
into the contract). 
69 Id. § 2-207(1).   
70 Id. (emphasis added). 
71 See id. § 2-207(2) (“The additional terms are to be construed as proposals for addition to the 
contract.”); see also Murray, supra note 50, at 22 (providing a written confirmation hypothetical). 
72 See U.C.C. § 2-207(2) (establishing that additional terms in written confirmations will “be 
construed as proposals for addition to the contract” involving non-merchants). 
73 Id. 
74 See id. (asserting that additional terms do not become part of a contract between merchants if: 
“(a) the offer expressly limits acceptance to the terms of the offer; (b) they materially alter it; or (c) 
notification of objection to them has already been given or is given within a reasonable time after 
notice of them is received”). 
75 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 26 (1981) (“A manifestation of willingness to 
enter into a bargain is not an offer if the person to whom it is addressed knows or has reason to know 
that the person making it does not intend to conclude a bargain until he has made a further 
manifestation of assent.”); CORBIN, supra note 41, § 2.4 (“[A]dvertisements that describe goods for 
sale at a given price are not reasonably to be understood as offers.”). 
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gives him the sandwich, as either would appear to be a reasonable mode of 
acceptance under the circumstances.76  Under this formulation, the parties 
have a contract; so when the buyer gets back home or to his office and sees 
additional terms, it would appear that this is a confirmation.77  By 
application of sections 2-207(1) and (2), if the buyer is a non-merchant, he 
can ignore these terms and eat his sandwich without concern for whether 
the act of opening or eating the sandwich will somehow bind him to these 
additional terms.78 
Alternatively, our man in the bar could have had a delivery menu, and 
rather than travel in person to the bar, he could have called his order in for 
delivery.  Again, the menu would not act as the offer but a solicitation.  
The call ordering the sandwich would be the offer, which the store could 
accept either orally or by charging his card, or under section 2-206(1)(b) 
by promptly shipping the sandwich.79  At the latest, once the goods are 
shipped, the contract is formed, and again the additional terms would 
simply serve as a confirmation subject to section 2-207(2).80 
The above basically describes how many thought contract formation 
under the U.C.C. would treat in-store and over-the-phone transactions.  It 
should be noted, however, that if the contract is in fact formed over the 
phone or in the store, the common law would not vary greatly from the 
above approach in situations involving non-merchants.  In situation one, 
the modification could not be unilaterally imposed upon the other party 
once a contract was formed and would additionally need to have 
consideration to support it (which is not required under the U.C.C.).81  
Similarly, if a contract was formed over the phone, then the later terms 
would simply be proposed modifications. 
                                                                                                                          
76 See U.C.C. §§ 1-103(b), 2-206 (incorporating common law to supplement the U.C.C. 
provisions and defining an offer and acceptance in the formation of a contract); RESTATEMENT 
(SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 24, 50 (defining an “offer” and “acceptance,” respectively). 
77 See U.C.C. § 2-207(2) (discussing additional terms); see also Murray, supra note 50, at 22 
(“Section 2-207(1) treats a confirmation as if it were an acceptance so that any different or additional 
terms are subject to 2-207(2) like any other definite expression of acceptance.”).  
78 See U.C.C. § 2-207(2) (“The additional terms are to be construed as proposals for addition to 
the contract.”). 
79 See id. § 2-206(1)(b) (“[A]n order or other offer to buy goods for prompt or current shipment 
shall be construed as inviting acceptance either by a prompt promise to ship or by the prompt or current 
shipment of conforming or non-conforming goods.”). 
80 See id. § 2-207(1)–(2) (establishing that such a written confirmation would operate as an 
acceptance despite its additional terms).  The terms would be “proposals,” as the hypothetical involves 
a non-merchant. 
81 See id. § 2-209(1) (stating that an agreement “modifying a contract . . . needs no consideration 
to be binding”); see also id. § 2-207(1) (establishing that an expression of acceptance or a written 
confirmation will operate as an acceptance even if it has been modified to state additional terms). 
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III.  THE BIRTH OF THE “ROLLING CONTRACT” 
A.  Development of the Rolling Contract Approach 
Though Judge Easterbrook’s opinion in ProCD II is one of the seminal 
cases in the development of rolling contract theory, the United States 
Supreme Court may have paved the way for Easterbrook five years earlier 
in the case of Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute.82  In Shute, the Court 
was faced with the enforceability of a forum selection clause.83  The 
petitioner, Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc., sold the Shutes cruise tickets 
through a travel agent.84  The Shutes paid for the tickets and were 
subsequently sent the tickets along with attached pages with additional 
terms and conditions of sale.85  Among the terms was a forum selection 
clause stipulating that all disputes would be litigated in Florida (Carnival’s 
principal place of business).86  During the course of the cruise, Mrs. Shute 
was injured while in international waters and brought suit in federal court 
in Washington.87  Carnival moved for summary judgment based upon the 
forum selection clause and lack of personal jurisdiction, which the district 
court granted based upon the latter.88 The court of appeals reversed, 
holding that jurisdiction was not lacking, and that the forum selection 
clause should not be enforced as it was not freely bargained for.89 
The Supreme Court reviewed the clause in light of its own precedent 
under Bremen v. Zapata Offshore Co.,90 another admiralty decision in 
which the validity of a forum selection clause negotiated by two 
sophisticated parties was upheld.91  The Shute Court noted that the forum 
selection clause at issue in Shute, unlike the one in Bremen, was one of 
adhesion, neither freely bargained for nor the subject of negotiation.92  
                                                                                                                          
82 499 U.S. 585 (1991), superseded by statute, Provisions Limiting Liability for Personal Injury or 
Death, 46 U.S.C. § 30509 (2006), as recognized in Oran v. Fair Wind Sailing, Inc., No. 08-0034, 2009 
WL 4349321, at *7 n.5 (D.V.I. Nov. 23, 2009); see Hillman, supra note 13, at 744–47 (describing 
standard-form contracts and the development of rolling contract theory). 
83 Shute, 499 U.S. at 587. 
84 Id. 
85 Id. at 587–88. 
86 Id. 
87 Id. at 588. 
88 Id. 
89 Id. at 588–89.  The court of appeals alternatively held that there was evidence that the Shutes 
were physically and financially incapable of pursuing their claim if the clause was enforced.  Id. at 589. 
90 407 U.S. 1 (1972). 
91 Id. at 15–17. 
92 Shute, 499 U.S. at 593.  Though the Court did not use the term “contract of adhesion,” its 
description of the forum selection clause at issue meets the classic definition of one.  The Court 
described the clause thusly: 
In contrast, respondents’ passage contract was purely routine and doubtless nearly 
identical to every commercial passage contract issued by petitioner and most other 
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Despite this conclusion, the Court upheld the clause’s validity based on 
what it termed the “reasonableness” of the clause under the 
circumstances.93  Specifically, the Court noted three rationales for why the 
clause was “reasonable,” all of which implicated economic concerns.  
First, the Court noted that Carnival had an interest in limiting where it 
could be sued, particularly given the diverse make-up of its clientele’s 
citizenship.94  Second, picking a forum in advance would save litigant and 
judicial resources by providing clarity as to where suit could be brought, 
thus limiting the expense of pretrial motions.95  Finally, the Court opined 
that consumers as a whole would actually benefit from such clauses as 
ticket prices would reflect the savings that cruise lines enjoyed by limiting 
where they could be sued.96  The Court did caveat its decision on the 
premise that all such clauses should be subject to judicial scrutiny, 
indicating that bad faith, fraud, over-reaching, and lack of conspicuousness 
should all be examined.97  However, the facts did not support such claims, 
and thus the clause was upheld.98 
There are a number of facts in the Shute decision that should be noted 
to limit its application.  First and foremost, the decision was one of the rare 
opportunities through which the Supreme Court opined on contract law 
without reference to state law, as the case was decided under the Court’s 
admiralty jurisdiction.99  Furthermore, the Court did not address the issue 
of whether a contract was formed due to lack of notice directly; indeed, the 
Shutes did not contest that the terms of the forum selection clause were 
reasonably communicated to them.100  Thus, the issue of when the offer 
                                                                                                                          
cruise lines.  In this context, it would be entirely unreasonable for us to assume that 
respondents—or any other cruise passenger—would negotiate with petitioners the 
terms of a forum-selection clause in an ordinary commercial cruise ticket.  Common 
sense dictates that a ticket of this kind will be a form contract the terms of which are 
not subject to negotiation, and that an individual purchasing the ticket will not have 
bargaining parity with the cruise line. 
Id. (citations omitted). 
93 Id. 
94 Id. 
95 Id. at 593–94. 
96 Id. at 594.  The Court additionally dismissed the court of appeals’s alternative ground that the 
Shutes would be incapable of pursuing litigation in Florida for financial and physical reasons as 
unsupported by the record.  Id. 
97 Id. at 595. 
98 Id.  The Court also rejected the Shutes’ argument that the forum selection clause violated 46 
U.S.C. § 183c, which limited the ability of vessel owners to contractually alter the rights of passengers 
to sue.  See id. at 595–97 (finding that the language of the forum-selection clause “does not take away 
respondents’ right to ‘a trial by [a] court of competent jurisdiction’” in violation of § 183c; rather, the 
forum-selection clause “states specifically that actions arising out of the passage contract shall be 
brought” in a “court of competent jurisdiction”).  
99 Id. at 590. 
100 Id. 
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and acceptance occurred, which is a central inquiry in rolling contract 
cases, was not squarely before the Court.  Even if it was, its precedential 
value under state law would have been merely persuasive.  Nonetheless, 
echoes of the Court’s reasonableness analysis and its economic rationales 
can be found in subsequent rolling contract cases, particularly in ProCD 
II.101 
The ProCD II opinion, authored by Judge Frank H. Easterbrook, is the 
modern genesis of rolling contract theory.102  The facts at issue in the case 
mirror, in many ways, the hypotheticals used in Part I and Part II of this 
Article. Matthew Zeidenberg entered a local retail store and bought 
ProCD’s product, “Select Phone,” which was a CD-ROM disk containing 
over 95,000,000 telephone listings compiled by ProCD.103  Inside the 
package was a user guide, which also contained a “Single User License 
Agreement” that prohibited the purchaser from copying the software other 
than for personal use.104  Additionally, once the software was loaded, the 
license would appear on most screens before the listings could be 
accessed.105  The license provided that: “By using the discs and the listings 
licensed to you, you agree to be bound by the terms of this License.  If you 
do not agree to the terms of this License, promptly return all copies of the 
software . . . to the place where you obtained it.”106  The software’s box 
made reference to the license on the outside in small print, but did not give 
any details.107  Zeidenberg purchased Select Phone in late 1994 and soon 
realized he could copy the information and make it available to the public 
himself.108  He subsequently incorporated under the name Silken Mountain 
Web Services, Inc. and purchased an updated version of Select Phone.109  
Zeidenberg ignored the license agreement, believing it was not binding, 
and eventually made his database available over the Internet.110 
ProCD learned of Zeidenberg’s actions and brought suit to enjoin him, 
claiming both a violation of copyright law as well as violation of the 
                                                                                                                          
101 See ProCD II, 86 F.3d 1447, 1451 (7th Cir. 1996) (“The ticket contains elaborate terms, which 
the traveler can reject by canceling the reservation.  To use the ticket is to accept the terms, even terms 
that in retrospect are disadvantageous.” (citing Shute, 499 U.S. 585)). 
102 See DeFontes v. Dell, Inc., 984 A.2d 1061, 1068 (R.I. 2009) (“In ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 
the court challenged the traditional understanding of offer and acceptance in consumer transactions by 
holding that a buyer of software was bound by an agreement that was included within the packaging 
and later appeared when the buyer first used the software.” (citation omitted)). 
103 ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg (ProCD I), 908 F. Supp. 640, 644–45 (W.D. Wis.), rev’d, 86 F.3d 
1447, 1451 (7th Cir. 1996). 
104 Id. at 644. 
105 Id. at 644–45. 
106 Id. at 644. 
107 Id. at 645.  
108 Id. 
109 Id. 
110 Id. at 645–46. 
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license agreement.111  After dispatching ProCD’s copyright claim, the 
district court turned to the enforceability of the license agreement under the 
U.C.C.112  In its analysis, the court considered whether the contract offer 
was accepted once Zeidenberg had received the goods and had an 
opportunity to inspect them, or whether the contract was formed in the 
store and thus the terms of the license should be viewed under either 
U.C.C. section 2-207 or as a modification under section 2-209.113  
Reviewing section 2-206, the court concluded that the act of placing the 
Select Phone product on the store shelf constituted the offer,114 which was 
accepted by Zeidenberg when he paid for the software.115  With the 
contract formed in the store, the district court concluded that the additional 
terms of the license agreement were mere proposals that could be ignored 
by Zeidenberg either under section 2-207(2) or as a modification under 
section 2-209, both of which would require Zeidenberg’s express 
consent.116  Thus, the district court’s approach was generally in line with 
the consensus on how such terms should be treated, as discussed in Part II. 
On appeal, Judge Easterbrook began his analysis by noting that 
Zeidenberg and the district court had found that the offer was made when 
the goods were placed on the shelf.117  Easterbrook did not take issue with 
this premise, but instead questioned the district court’s treatment of the 
                                                                                                                          
111 Id. at 646, 650. 
112 Id. at 650–51.  The district court noted that the sale of software put forward a question of 
whether Article II of the U.C.C., which applies to the sale of “goods,” should apply.  Id.  The district 
court chose to apply Article II, believing it the sounder approach to software transactions.  Id. at 651. 
113 Id. 
114 Id. at 651–52.  This conclusion is counter to the generally accepted rule that placing of the 
goods on the shelf is not the offer, but merely a solicitation.  See CORBIN, supra note 41, § 2.4 (“It is 
quite possible to make a definite and operative offer to buy or sell goods by advertisement, in a 
newspaper, by a handbill, a catalog or circular or on a placard in a store window.  It is not customary to 
do this, however; and the presumption is the other way.” (footnote omitted)).  Apparently, the argument 
that the offer was made by Zeidenberg in the store when he tendered his money was not made to the 
court.  See Gerald Caplan, Legal Autopsies: Assessing the Performance of Judges and Lawyers 
Through the Window of Leading Contract Cases, 73 ALB. L. REV. 1, 39 n.218 (2009) (“The record in 
ProCD, however, indicates that it was the parties, not the trial court or the Seventh Circuit, who so 
decided.”); see also Epstein, supra note 1, at 109 (“The Easterbrook analysis of delayed 
acceptance . . . solves the central problem with shrinkwrap contracts.”). 
115 ProCD I, 908 F. Supp. at 652. 
116 See id. at 654–55 (finding that the defendants were not bound by the user agreement under 
either section 2-207 or section 2-209, because they had not expressly agreed to the terms contained 
therein).  Interestingly, the court seemed to assume Zeidenberg was a consumer and thus did not 
consider the application of subsections 2-207(2)(a)–(c).  It seems possible that Zeidenberg could have 
been bound, as a merchant, to the license agreement if it did not materially alter the contract.  See 
U.C.C. § 2-207(2)(b) (2011) (providing that additional terms in an acceptance become part of a 
contract between merchants unless “they materially alter it”).  The court may have considered this 
argument mooted by its subsequent holding in the same opinion that ProCD’s contract claims were 
preempted under federal copyright law.  ProCD I, 908 F. Supp. at 659. 
117 ProCD II, 86 F.3d 1447, 1450 (7th Cir. 1996). 
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acceptance, which the district court held occurred in the store.118  
Easterbrook did not agree with this premise, asking: “[w]hy would 
Wisconsin fetter the parties’ choice in this way?”119  Easterbrook then 
described the advantages of permitting standard term agreements to be 
enforceable, despite the fact that they are often read for the first time after 
the buyer has the goods.120  These advantages include the saved time and 
expense of trying to describe all of the terms on the outside of a box.121  As 
examples of the utility of such contracts, Easterbrook references the 
insurance industry, drug industry, and the purchase of airline and concert 
tickets, all of which take advantage of the ability to provide information or 
terms after a purchase has been made.122  Interestingly, Easterbrook 
frequently refers to the ongoing relationship between the purchaser and the 
seller, such as the expected coverage an insured immediately gets when the 
premium is paid, though the details are still coming.123  While there may be 
practical and economic advantages (particularly to the vendor/seller) in 
doing business in such a way, what of the district court’s analysis under 
section 2-207?  Easterbrook summarily dismisses its application stating, 
“Our case has only one form; UCC § 2-207 is irrelevant.”124 
Instead of analyzing under section 2-207 (or section 2-206, which is 
not even mentioned), Easterbrook turned to U.C.C. section 2-204 as the 
guiding principle for such “terms later” contracts.125  Section 2-204 broadly 
provides that a contract may be formed “in any manner sufficient to show 
agreement,” which Easterbrook used to justify his view that the vendor or 
seller is the master of its offer and can choose to invite acceptance by 
conduct, such as by using the product.126  This view of contract formation 
is limited by the caveat that the buyer must be given an opportunity to 
review and reject the offer; otherwise, such contracts are enforceable.127  
Thus, as Zeidenberg had been given notice of the license agreement and 
continued to use the software, he was bound by the license agreement’s 
                                                                                                                          
118 Id. 
119 Id. at 1450–51. 
120 See id. at 1451 (“Notice on the outside, terms on the inside, and a right to return the software 
for a refund if the terms are unacceptable . . . may be a means of doing business valuable to buyers and 
sellers alike.”). 
121 See id. (“Vendors can put the entire terms of a contract on the outside of a box only by using 
microscopic type, removing other information that buyers might find more useful . . . or both.”). 
122 Id. (citing Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute, 499 U.S. 585 (1991)). 
123 Id. 
124 Id. at 1452.  Easterbrook does not appear to address the district court’s section 2-209 
discussion; however, given his conclusion that these were the terms of the contract rather than a 
modification of an already existing contract, the omission is not surprising. 
125 Id. 
126 Id. (quoting U.C.C. § 2-204(1) (1995)). 
127 See id. (“A buyer may accept by performing the acts the vendor proposes to treat as 
acceptance.  And that is what happened.”).  
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terms.128 
B.  ProCD II’s Progeny and the Limits of the Rolling Contract Approach 
Many questioned the applicability of ProCD II beyond the narrow 
facts at hand.129  The case involved a buyer, who was arguably a merchant 
and had notice of the terms at issue prior to purchasing the subsequent CD-
ROMs.130  Additionally, the case involved an atypical good—software.131  
However, any doubt about how Easterbrook felt about the broader 
applicability of his new view of contract formation was quickly addressed 
a little over seven months later when he authored the opinion in Hill v. 
Gateway 2000, Inc.132 
In Hill, Rich and Enza Hill purchased a Gateway computer over the 
phone.133  The Hills gave their credit card information, but were never 
alerted to any additional terms that were coming with the computer.134  
Once the computer arrived, the Hills found a list of terms inside the box—
including an arbitration clause—that purportedly governed the parties’ 
agreement unless the Hills returned the product within thirty days.135  The 
Hills did not return the computer within the thirty-day period, but 
eventually found fault with the computer and sought to sue Gateway for 
civil RICO violations.136  Gateway invoked the arbitration clause, but the 
district court refused to uphold the clause because the Hills were not given 
adequate notice of the terms.137 
On appeal, the Seventh Circuit vacated and remanded, finding that the 
terms of the contract that came in the box were fully enforceable.138  Citing 
to ProCD II, as well as to Shute, Judge Easterbrook, with broad strokes, 
affirmed the use of standard form contracts that come later, stating that 
these cases “exemplify the many commercial transactions in which people 
pay for products with terms to follow.”139  Easterbrook stated that the 
                                                                                                                          
128 Id. at 1452–53.  The court of appeals went on to address the district court’s alternative finding 
that the contract was preempted by federal law and found that the Copyright Act did not preempt 
ProCD’s contract claim.  Id. at 1454–55. 
129 See, e.g., Klocek v. Gateway, Inc., 104 F. Supp. 2d 1332, 1337–38 (D. Kan. 2000) (comparing 
cases that had to determine “whether terms received with a product become part of the parties’ 
agreement” and noting that the cases partly turn on whether it is found that the parties formed the 
contract before or after terms are communicated). 
130 ProCD II, 86 F.3d at 1449–50. 
131 Id. at 1449. 
132 105 F.3d 1147 (7th Cir. 1997). 
133 Id. at 1148. 
134 Id. 
135 Id. 
136 Id. 
137 Id. 
138 Id. at 1151. 
139 Id. at 1148–49. 
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transaction at issue was governed by these same principles, as Gateway 
used the “same sort of accept-or-return offer ProCD made to users of its 
software.”140  Of particular note is that Easterbrook explicitly rejected the 
notion that ProCD II should be limited to software sales,141 or that it 
mattered whether there was a notice of the coming terms on the outside of 
the box (as was the case in ProCD II).142  Easterbrook also dismissed the 
notion that the ProCD II decision somehow turned upon application of 
U.C.C. section 2-207, again erroneously dismissing the provision as 
irrelevant because there was only one form;143 however, he did elaborate 
on the true question presented in ProCD II:  
The question in ProCD was not whether terms were added to 
a contract after its formation, but how and when the contract 
was formed—in particular, whether a vendor may propose 
that a contract of sale be formed, not in the store (or over the 
phone) with the payment of money or a general “send me the 
product,” but after the customer has had a chance to inspect 
both the item and the terms.  ProCD answers “yes,” for 
merchants and consumers alike.144 
Thus, to Easterbrook, the issue was simple—whether a vendor can 
transform an in-store or over-the-phone contract into a mere offer—and it 
was resolved in favor of the vendor whom he claims is the “master of the 
offer.”145  However, Easterbrook gives no guidance on the issue of when, if 
ever, a contract is formed in-store or over-the-phone.  His analysis in Hill, 
like in ProCD II, seems to turn on the simple efficiency (and thus 
economics) of rolling contracts rather than on the intention of the parties or 
the nature of their relationship under the contract.146  Indeed, Easterbrook 
                                                                                                                          
140 Id. at 1149. 
141 Id. 
142 Id. at 1150.  Easterbrook also noted, in dicta, that he was doubtful of Zeidenberg’s merchant 
status, even if section 2-207 did apply, as he bought the software at a retail shop.  Id.  This fact should 
not preclude merchant status, but has added fodder for those who have excoriated his application of the 
U.C.C.  See, e.g., Cheryl B. Preston & Eli W. McCann, Unwrapping Shrinkwraps, Clickwraps, and 
Browsewraps: How the Law Went Wrong from Horse Traders to the Law of the Horse, 26 BYU J. 
PUB. L. 1, 10 (2011) (“[ProCD II] is a classic case of putting the cart before the horse.  Rather than 
resolve the case through the mechanism established in the Uniform Commercial Code (U.C.C.) for 
dealing with later additions of new and different terms, Judge Easterbrook first articulated the result he 
believed he had to obtain for purposes of supporting market economics, and then simply declared that 
the terms were enforceable without much effort to locate a rule somewhere in traditional contract law.” 
(footnote omitted)). 
143 Hill, 105 F.3d at 1149–50. 
144 Id. at 1150. 
145 Id. at 1149. 
146 See id. (“Practical considerations support allowing vendors to enclose the full legal terms with 
their products.  Cashiers cannot be expected to read legal documents to customers before ringing up 
sales.”). 
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dismisses the notion that it should matter whether the contract is an 
executory one;147 however, he does note that the contracts at issue in both 
ProCD II and Hill involved continuing obligations, such as ongoing 
customer service and warranties, perhaps indicating that such obligations 
factored into the analysis.148  Furthermore, in both cases, Easterbrook 
pointed out that there was notice of additional terms to come, though in 
Hill the notice was through Gateway’s advertisements rather than on the 
box.149 
Despite the analytical flaws in both ProCD II and Hill, the opinions 
have been widely cited and adopted in a number of decisions on the issue 
of whether “rolling” or “layered” contracts are enforceable.  Some 
commentators150 and a number of courts, both state and federal, have cited 
approvingly to the “rolling contract” approach.151  Unfortunately, a number 
                                                                                                                          
147 Id. at 1149–50. 
148 See id. at 1149 (“[B]oth ProCD and Gateway promised to help customers to use their products.  
Long-term service and information obligations are common in the computer business, on both 
hardware and software sides.”). 
149 Id. at 1150. 
150 See Epstein, supra note 1, at 122 (defending Easterbrook’s approach on intellectual grounds 
and suggesting that courts and commentators that are critical of the approach are uneasy with the way it 
meshes with traditional doctrinal analysis); Hillman, supra note 13, at 744–45 (arguing that because 
few parties even think about when contract formation occurs, and given that consumers do not read the 
terms regardless of when the contract was formed, the formation issue should not be a bar to rolling 
contracts and such contracts should instead simply be reviewed for their conscionability); see also 
Andrew Vogeler, Note, Rolling Contract Formation and the U.C.C.’s Approach to Emerging 
Commercial Practices, 30 J.L. & COM. 243, 243–44 (2012) (arguing that rolling contract theory is 
consistent with the policies underlying the U.C.C.).  This approach has also been adopted under the 
Uniform Computer Information Transactions Act (UCITA).  UNIF. COMPUTER INFO. TRANSACTIONS 
ACT § 202 cmt. 4 (2002). 
151 See, e.g., Sherr v. Dell, Inc., No. 05 CV 10097(GBD), 2006 WL 2109436, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. July 
27, 2006) (“Approve-or-return contracts have been found to be enforceable in consumer 
transactions.”); Meridian Project Sys., Inc. v. Hardin Constr. Co., 426 F. Supp. 2d 1101, 1107 (E.D. 
Cal. 2006) (finding the rationale in ProCD II “compelling” and recognizing that where a consumer had 
notice of an end user license agreement and an opportunity to return the software if he did not agree to 
the terms, the agreement is not “rendered invalid” solely because the consumer did not receive the 
agreement before opening the package); Chandler v. AT&T Wireless Servs., Inc., 358 F. Supp. 2d 701, 
704 (S.D. Ill. 2005) (“By using her phone rather than canceling immediately, or no later than thirty 
days after her activation date, Chandler accepted the offered services and the terms and conditions 
under which they were offered.  She had a clear mechanism and reasonable opportunity to reject 
them.”); Davidson & Assocs. v. Internet Gateway, 334 F. Supp. 2d 1164, 1178 (E.D. Mo. 2004) 
(“[T]he defendants had sufficient notice of the EULAs and TOU.  It is true that the terms of the EULAs 
and TOU were not on the box, but the terms were disclosed before installation of the games and access 
to Battle.net was granted.  The defendants also expressly consented to the terms of the EULA and TOU 
by clicking ‘I Agree’ and ‘Agree.’ . . . Accordingly, the Court finds that the EULA and TOU are 
enforceable contracts under both Missouri or California law.”); O’Quin v. Verizon Wireless, 256 F. 
Supp. 2d 512, 515–16 (M.D. La. 2003) (approving of the approach taken in Hill and ProCD); Mudd-
Lyman Sales & Serv. Corp. v. United Parcel Serv., 236 F. Supp. 2d 907, 911 (N.D. Ill. 2002) (“The 
Court finds that Mudd-Lyman accepted the terms of UPS’s limitation of liability through the breaking 
of the shrinkwrap seal and by its on-screen acceptance of the terms of the software license agreement.  
Mudd-Lyman was thereby provided with reasonable notice of UPS’s limited liability and was given a 
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of these courts have failed to analyze why the common understanding of 
contract formation should be displaced by the “rolling” contract, and 
instead simply cite to the aforementioned cases and adopt their 
approach.152 
One of the first cases to cite to this duo of cases, Brower v. Gateway 
2000 Inc.,153 is emblematic of such an approach.  Brower involved a 
similar fact pattern as Hill, and the same arbitration clause at issue in 
Hill.154  In Brower, a class of consumers had purchased computers and 
software products from Gateway either by mail-order or over the phone.155  
When the goods arrived, a copy of Gateway’s “Standard Terms and 
Conditions Agreement” was found with the product.156  Among other 
things, the agreement provided an arbitration clause and stated that, by 
                                                                                                                          
fair opportunity to purchase higher liability.”); Bischoff v. DirecTV, Inc., 180 F. Supp. 2d 1097, 1105 
(C.D. Cal. 2002) (finding Hill to be “instructive”); I.Lan Sys., Inc. v. NetScout Serv. Level Corp., 183 
F. Supp. 2d 328, 338 (D. Mass. 2002) (agreeing “with those cases embracing the theory of ProCD,” 
holding that “clickwrap license agreements are an appropriate way to form contracts,” and determining 
that “‘[m]oney now, terms later’ is a practical way to form contracts, especially with purchasers of 
software”); Westendorf v. Gateway 2000, Inc., No. 16913, 2000 WL 307369, at *3 (Del. Ch. Mar. 16, 
2000) (“The 7th Circuit rejected that argument, however, and found the agreement enforceable as 
written.  Judge Easterbrook, writing for the unanimous panel, noted ‘[b]y keeping the computer beyond 
30 days, the [buyers] accepted Gateway’s offer, including the arbitration clause.’  Undeniably, plaintiff 
in the present case retained the computer and accessories for more than thirty days.  The same rationale, 
therefore, applies to this plaintiff as in the case before the 7th Circuit.” (alteration in original) 
(footnotes omitted) (quoting Hill, 105 F.3d at 1150)), aff’d, 763 A.2d 92 (Del. 2000); Rinaldi v. Iomega 
Corp., No. 98C-09-064-RRC, 1999 WL 1442014, at *3 (Del. Super. Ct. Sept. 3, 1999) (“Analogous 
support for this Court’s conclusion that the physical location of the disclaimer of the implied warranty 
of merchantability inside the Zip drive packaging does not make the disclaimer inconspicuous can be 
found in some cases from other jurisdictions.”); Stenzel v. Dell, Inc., 870 A.2d 133, 140 (Me. 2005) 
(“By accepting delivery of the computers, and then failing to exercise their right to return the 
computers as provided by the agreement, Stenzel and Gerber expressly manifested their assent to be 
bound by the agreement, including its arbitration clause.”); Brower v. Gateway 2000, Inc., 246 A.D.2d 
246, 251 (N.Y. App. Div. 1998) (“While Hill and ProCD, as the IAS Court recognized, are not 
controlling (although they are decisions of the United States Court of Appeals for the circuit 
encompassing the forum State designated for arbitration), we agree with their rationale that, in such 
transactions, there is no agreement or contract upon the placement of the order or even upon the receipt 
of the goods.”); Levy v. Gateway 2000, Inc., 1997 WL 823611 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Aug. 12, 1997) (holding 
that section 2-207 did not apply as the contract formed once the plaintiff exercised the opportunity to 
accept the goods and accompanying terms); DeFontes v. Dell, Inc., 984 A.2d 1061, 1071 (R.I. 2009) 
(“[W]e are satisfied that the ProCD line of cases is better reasoned and more consistent with 
contemporary consumer transactions.”); M.A. Mortenson Co. v. Timberline Software Corp., 998 P.2d 
305, 313 (Wash. 2000) (en banc) (“We find the approach of the ProCD, Hill, and Brower courts 
persuasive and adopt it to guide our analysis . . . .”).  
152 See, e.g., Mortenson, 998 P.2d at 313 (“We find the approach of the ProCD, Hill, and Brower 
courts persuasive and adopt it . . . .”); Brower, 246 A.D.2d at 250–51 (noting that ProCD II and Hill 
were applicable); see also Friedman, supra note 28, at 11 (summarizing cases which focus on return 
policies rather than notice). 
153 246 A.D.2d 246. 
154 Id. at 250. 
155 Id. at 248. 
156 Id. 
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keeping the computer beyond thirty days, the consumer would consent to 
the terms of the agreement.157  A group of consumers subsequently sued 
for breach of warranty and other causes of action related to the goods, and 
Gateway moved to dismiss due to the arbitration clause.158  On appeal, the 
consumers argued that the clause was not enforceable under U.C.C. section 
2-207.159  The court, guided by ProCD and Hill, found that provision 
inapplicable.  Instead, the court adopted the “rolling contract” approach, 
stating: 
[W]e agree with [ProCD II and Hill’s] rationale that, in such 
transactions, there is no agreement or contract upon the 
placement of the order or even upon the receipt of the goods.  
By the terms of the Agreement at issue, it is only after the 
consumer has affirmatively retained the merchandise for 
more than 30 days—within which the consumer has 
presumably examined and even used the product(s) and read 
the agreement—that the contract has been effectuated.160 
However, any mention of why the consumers should be on notice as to 
forthcoming terms was noticeably absent from its discussion.161  
Furthermore, the decision makes no mention of U.C.C. section 2-206 or 
why such orders made over the phone (or by mail) are not offers by the 
consumers.  Given the analytical flaws in Easterbrook’s analysis, this 
failure to even examine the interplay of U.C.C. sections 2-206 and 2-207 
and why the basic understanding of contract formation should be dismissed 
is troubling. 
The subsequent case of M.A. Mortenson Co. v. Timberline Software 
Corp.,162 which also relied upon ProCD and Hill, demonstrates the dangers 
of this approach.  M.A. Mortenson Company (Mortenson), a general 
construction contractor, purchased software from Timberline Software 
Corporation (Timberline).163  The software was used to assist in calculating 
bids.164  Mortenson had been using Timberline software for approximately 
three years when it sought to purchase a newer version of the software and 
asked for a price quote.165  Upon receiving the quote, Mortenson placed a 
                                                                                                                          
157 Id. 
158 Id. at 248–49. 
159 Id. at 249. 
160 Id. at 251. 
161 See Friedman, supra note 28, at 11 n.63 (citing Brower as an example of a case in which the 
court followed Hill’s rationale without considering whether the buyer received any notice that 
additional terms would be included post-purchase). 
162 998 P.2d 305 (Wash. 2000) (en banc). 
163 Id. at 307.  Mortenson actually purchased the software from a licensed dealer of Timberline’s, 
Softworks Data Systems, Inc.; however, the opinion focuses on Timberline.  Id. 
164 Id. 
165 Id. 
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purchase order, which detailed price, quantity, credits to be given for past 
purchases, software support, notice that any changes in the goods or costs 
needed prior approval, and a request to be notified promptly if shipping 
could not occur as detailed.166  In response to the order, Timberline sent the 
software, which came packaged with a license agreement as well as a 
limitation on consequential damages.167  The license advised that if the 
buyer did not agree to the terms, it should promptly return the programs for 
a full refund.168  Mortenson proceeded to use the software to calculate a 
bid, but due to a glitch in the software, Mortenson underbid a project—
which it was awarded—by $1.95 million.169  Mortenson sued, and 
Timberline moved for summary judgment based on the consequential 
damages limitation found in the licensing agreement.  Timberline’s motion 
was granted and upheld by the court of appeals.170 
On appeal to the Washington Supreme Court, Mortenson argued that 
the consequential damage limitation was barred under U.C.C. section 2-
207(2) as a material alteration to the contract.171  The court dismissed the 
applicability of section 2-207 as it found the contract was not formed until 
Mortenson had assented to the license agreement.172  The court thus 
avoided any discussion of U.C.C. section 2-206, and instead decided the 
case under the broad language of section 2-204 and rolling contract 
theory.173  This failure to address why Mortenson’s purchase order was not 
an offer leaves one with the notion that all a vendor needs to do to apply its 
terms is to ship favorable contract terms after the purchase and grant an 
opportunity for the buyer to reject them—a result which harkens back to 
the “last-shot” doctrine that U.C.C. section 2-207 was meant to address.174 
The rolling contract theory does have its limits.  For instance, a 
consistent theme in rolling contract cases is the right of the buyer to return 
the goods should the buyer not agree to the terms presented.  This is really 
no more than the concept that an offeree is free to accept or reject an offer.  
                                                                                                                          
166 Id. at 307–08. 
167 Id. at 308. 
168 Id. 
169 Id. at 309. 
170 Id. at 309–10. 
171 Id. at 311. 
172 Id. at 313 (citing ProCD II, Hill, and Brower).  Mortenson attempted to apply Step-Saver, 
which followed the more traditional approach to contract formation.  Id. at 311–12.  Interestingly, in 
distinguishing the case before it from Step-Saver, the court noted that Mortenson and Timberline had 
utilized a license agreement throughout their prior relationship.  Id. at 312.  Had the court’s majority 
bothered to conduct such an analysis, this fact could have been persuasive in determining why the 
initial purchase order was not the offer under section 2-206. 
173 Id. at 312–13. 
174 See John E. Murray, Jr., The Chaos of the “Battle of the Forms”: Solutions, 39 VAND. L. REV. 
1307, 1331 (1986) (“[Section 2-207’s] purpose was to alter the ‘matching acceptance’ rule, which 
oppressed the offeror under the ‘last shot’ principle.”). 
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Furthermore, the consequences of keeping the product must be made clear 
to the buyer.  As the court in DeFontes v. Dell, Inc.175—a case involving 
Dell’s ability to compel arbitration through its rolling contract standard 
terms176—stated: 
Yet in adopting the so-called “layered contracting” theory of 
formation, we reiterate that the burden falls squarely on the 
seller to show that the buyer has accepted the seller’s terms 
after delivery.  Thus, the crucial question in this case is 
whether defendants reasonably invited acceptance by making 
clear in the terms and conditions agreement that (1) by 
accepting defendants’ product the consumer was accepting 
the terms and conditions contained within and (2) the 
consumer could reject the terms and conditions by returning 
the product.177 
The court concluded that the failure to inform the purchasers how to reject 
the offer prevented the terms from taking effect.178   
Finally, rolling contracts are still vulnerable to the other doctrines of 
contract voidability, such as unconscionability.179  Thus, in the Brower 
case, though the court held the contract was formed on a rolling contract 
theory, it nonetheless reformed the arbitration clause at issue as being 
substantively unconscionable.180 
C.  Criticisms and Critiques of the Rolling Contract Approach 
While some courts eagerly embraced the “rolling contract” theory,181 a 
number of courts have declined an invitation to depart from the traditional 
contract formation paradigm.182  In Klocek v. Gateway, Inc.,183 the United 
                                                                                                                          
175 984 A.2d 1061 (R.I. 2009). 
176 Id. at 1063. 
177 Id. at 1071 (footnote omitted). 
178 Id. at 1073. 
179 One commentator has argued that unconscionability should be sufficient ground to deal with 
rolling contract law, and that focusing on the timing of contract formation “yields little fruit.”  Hillman, 
supra note 13, at 744–45.  To the degree that current attitudes in the law regarding unconscionability 
render it an ineffective defense, Hillman simply asserts that these concerns should be taken up with 
lawmakers.  Id. at 757. 
180 Brower v. Gateway 2000, Inc., 246 A.D.2d 246, 254–56 (N.Y. App. Div. 1998).  The clause at 
issue in Brower required arbitration before the International Chamber of Commerce, which was cost 
prohibitive to the normal consumer.  Id. at 254–55.  Thus, the court found that provision of the 
arbitration agreement unconscionable and remanded to determine a more appropriate arbitrator.  Id. at 
255–56. 
181 See, e.g., Meridian Project Sys. v. Hardin Constr. Co., 426 F. Supp. 2d 1101, 1107 (E.D. Cal. 
2006) (finding the rationale in ProCD II “compelling”). 
182 See, e.g., Klocek v. Gateway, Inc., 104 F. Supp. 2d 1332, 1339 (D. Kan. 2000) (“The Court is 
not persuaded that Kansas or Missouri courts would follow the Seventh Circuit reasoning in Hill and 
ProCD.”). 
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States District Court for the District of Kansas was faced with the now 
familiar fact-pattern: a consumer who received terms and conditions after 
purchasing a Gateway computer.184  In response to the consumer’s lawsuit, 
Gateway moved to dismiss under an arbitration clause found in the later-
revealed terms, and urged the district court to follow the precedent 
established in Hill.185  The court declined to do so, however, by first noting 
that the Seventh Circuit’s conclusion regarding the inapplicability of 
U.C.C. section 2-207 was “not supported by the statute or by Kansas or 
Missouri law.”186  The court then refuted Judge Easterbrook’s assertion 
that the “vendor is the master of the offer,”187 and explained: 
In typical consumer transactions, the purchaser is the offeror, 
and the vendor is the offeree.  While it is possible for the 
vendor to be the offeror, Gateway provides no factual 
evidence which would support such a finding in this case.  
The Court therefore assumes for purposes of the motion to 
dismiss that plaintiff offered to purchase the computer (either 
in person or through catalog order) and that Gateway 
accepted plaintiff’s offer (either by completing the sales 
transaction in person or by agreeing to ship and/or shipping 
the computer to plaintiff).188 
As section 2-207 was applicable, the court refused to enforce the 
arbitration clause because it was not a part of the original contract, and the 
consumer did not expressly agree to the new terms.189 
The Klocek court is not alone in declining to adopt the “rolling 
contract” approach or in pointing out the doctrinal disconnect of 
Easterbrook’s analysis.  A number of other courts have similarly either 
declined to follow or distinguished ProCD II and Hill.190  Furthermore, 
                                                                                                                          
183 Id. at 1334–35. 
184 Id. at 1334. 
185 Id. at 1334, 1338. 
186 Id. at 1339. 
187 See id. at 1340 (quoting ProCD II, 86 F.3d 1447, 1452 (7th Cir. 1996)). 
188 Id. (citations omitted). 
189 Id. at 1341. 
190 See Schnabel v. Trilegiant Corp., No. 3:10-CV-957 JCH, 2011 WL 797505, at *3–4 (D.  Conn. 
Feb. 24, 2011) (determining that enrolling in a program online, paying monthly fees, and receiving 
terms and conditions by email did not constitute assent to such terms as the contract was already 
formed before the consumers received the email), aff’d, 697 F.3d 110 (2d Cir. 2012); Ben-Trei 
Overseas, L.L.C. v. Gerdau Ameristeel US, Inc., No. 09-CV-153-TCK-TLW, 2010 WL 582205, at *6–
7 (N.D. Okla. Feb. 10, 2010) (finding that a forum selection clause was an additional term, governed by 
U.C.C. section 2-207, rather than an implied term in line with the parties’ course of dealing); Triad Int’l 
Maint. Corp. v. Aim Aviation, Inc., 473 F. Supp. 2d 666, 670 n.2 (M.D.N.C. 2006) (stating that a 
forum selection clause found on the back of an acknowledgement form may not be a part of the 
contract under U.C.C. section 2-207); Wachter Mgmt. Co. v. Dexter & Chaney, Inc., 144 P.3d 747, 752 
(Kan. 2006) (rejecting an argument that a consumer “expressly consented to the shrinkwrap agreement 
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numerous commentators have criticized the rolling contract approach on 
various grounds, such as the doctrinal analysis,191 the economic 
assumptions it makes,192 the norms it stands for,193 moral grounds,194 and 
fairness.195  However, the rolling contract theory certainly has its appealing 
side with regard to efficiency, and too strict an adherence to traditional 
contract formation could obstruct freedom of contract.  In response to these 
various concerns, commentators have suggested solutions that would 
address fairness and efficiency by increasing the notice requirements so 
that consumers can be aware of the terms’ existence ex ante.196 
Recognizing that sellers need to have flexibility in deferring some 
                                                                                                                          
when it installed and used the software rather than returning it” by reasoning that “continuing with the 
contract after receiving a writing with additional or different terms is not sufficient to establish express 
consent to the additional or different terms”); Licitra v. Gateway, Inc., 734 N.Y.S.2d 389, 393 (N.Y. 
Civ. Ct. 2001) (holding that even though the buyer chose to retain the computer, the terms should not 
be enforced because of the “‘take it or leave it’ situation,” including non-negotiable terms and no 
mechanism through which the customer would be able to question the terms); Rogers v. Dell Computer 
Corp., 138 P.3d 826, 834 (Okla. 2005) (“Section 2-207 and other provisions of the U.C.C. apply to the 
contracts here and apply to terms which Dell can show were enclosed with the invoice, with the 
acknowledgment, or in the package containing the purchased product.”); Lively v. IJAM, Inc., 114 P.3d 
487, 492–93 (Okla. Civ. App. 2005) (conducting its analysis under section 2-207, deciding there was 
insufficient evidence to determine whether the plaintiff was a merchant, and finding that the plaintiff 
was not bound by the forum selection clause as it materially altered the contract). 
191 See Bern, supra note 7, at 642–43 n.5 (collecting criticisms); Shubha Ghosh, Where’s the 
Sense in Hill v. Gateway 2000?: Reflections on the Visible Hand of Norm Creation, 16 TOURO L. REV. 
1125, 1134 (2000) (“Even though Judge Easterbrook concludes that § 2-207 is inapplicable because the 
provision governs the situation when there are two opposing forms from the offeror and the offeree, not 
one as in the Gateway 2000 case, this view has been expressly rejected.”); Hillman, supra note 13, at 
753 (“Easterbrook was plainly wrong about section 2-207’s applicability.  Nothing in the text of the 
section limits it to transactions involving more than one form.”); Murray, supra note 8, at 47–48 
(“Either this highly sophisticated court did not understand the contract formation sections of the 
U.C.C., or it chose to ignore them.”). 
192 See Bern, supra note 7, at 716–18 (characterizing Easterbrook’s “Terms Later” approach as 
ignorant of human nature and economic reality); Ghosh, supra note 191, at 1139 (questioning the 
assumption that the terms in rolling contracts are efficient). 
193 See Ghosh, supra note 191, at 1129 (arguing that Judge Easterbrook’s opinion amounts to 
creating a norm to govern situations similar to Hill). 
194 See Bern, supra note 7, at 641–44, 742–53 (arguing Judge Easterbrook’s opinion lacks “moral 
sanction”). 
195 See id. at 643–44 (“[N]otwithstanding Easterbrook’s window dressing of economics, a rule 
sanctioning ‘terms later’ contracting increases . . . distributional unfairness by systematically 
redistributing wealth from consumers to vendors.”); Jean Braucher, Commentary, Amended Article 2 
and the Decision to Trust the Courts: The Case Against Enforcing Delayed Mass-Market Terms, 
Especially for Software, 2004 WIS. L. REV. 753, 757 (referring to rolling contracts as “steamrolling,” 
because they attempt to pile on undesirable terms). 
196 See Friedman, supra note 28, at 2 (“I propose a mechanism that will ensure that sellers 
continue to have needed flexibility to defer some contract terms, but that will also protect purchasers 
against the unfair imposition of unexpected and important contract terms arriving at a time when 
purchasers are very unlikely to read or act on them.”); Murray, supra note 8, at 77 (“There is neither 
unreasonable surprise nor oppression in binding a buyer to conscionable terms arriving inside a box, if 
the buyer has been sufficiently alerted to expect such terms, the buyer has ample time to digest them, 
and they may be rejected within a reasonable time.”). 
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terms, but also recognizing the potential for abuse of such practices, 
Professor Stephen Friedman proposes utilizing “template notice” as an 
intermediate solution.197  Upon reviewing ProCD and Hill, Friedman 
concludes that notice of additional terms is a key element of Easterbrook’s 
analysis in each opinion, even if it is rather easily met.198  Subsequent 
decisions have failed to give proper attention to the need to give buyers 
notice that additional terms are forthcoming.199  Therefore, Friedman 
proposes that all sellers be required to provide a “template notice” that:  
[P]rovide[s] the following vital information before or during 
purchase or order: a brief and clear list or summary of 
important terms being deferred (but not the full text), a 
statement that the buyer will have the right to reject the terms 
and avoid the transaction, and a description of how to 
exercise that right.200 
Such notice would permit buyers to be aware of the consequences of their 
purchase and the existence of additional terms without requiring sellers to 
provide those terms on the box itself.  This allows the purchaser to be 
aware of the terms when the purchaser is most focused on the transaction 
while also limiting the scope of terms that are agreed to through the initial 
nominal assent.201  
One of the weaknesses of the “template notice” approach, as noted by 
Professor John Murray, is that summaries of the terms, even if not given in 
detail, still face the obstacles that ProCD II and Hill sought to avoid, i.e., 
requiring unrealistic disclaimers that would not fit on a box or that would 
be too burdensome for a store clerk to handle.202  Furthermore, the 
adequacy of the summaries would be predictable litigation issues.203  
Instead, Murray suggests that all that should be required is a conspicuous 
notice that additional contract terms are inside the package.204  Murray’s 
suggested language is: “[R]ead the important contract terms inside this 
package.  If you are not satisfied with these contract terms, return the 
product for a full refund of the purchase price.”205  This model, according 
to Murray, would create a contract at the time the buyer purchases the item 
in the store, but subject to the condition of reading and agreeing to the 
                                                                                                                          
197 Friedman, supra note 28, at 2–4, 13–14. 
198 See id. at 10 (“Although the notice in ProCD and Hill may have been weak, at least it came 
before purchase or order.”). 
199 Id. at 10–12. 
200 Id. at 2–4. 
201 Id. at 29. 
202 Murray, supra note 8, at 77. 
203 Id. 
204 Id. at 77–78. 
205 Id. 
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terms inside the box.206 
Professor Murray’s proposal is an attractive one, but it is not without 
its own faults.  First, neither Murray nor Friedman fully explain how their 
increased disclosure models avoid the application of U.C.C. section 2-207 
(though Murray asserts that it does).207  According to Murray, the 
placement of a statement on the package indicating that the contract is 
subject to a condition solves the problem.208  Presumably, what is meant 
here is that when a buyer brings a product with such a disclaimer up to the 
counter, the buyer is making an offer with the condition listed on the 
product, which the vendor accepts.  Thus, section 2-207 would have no 
application because no additional terms are ever introduced.209  This 
rationale is not entirely convincing as an explanation of how courts would 
treat such matters.210  Recall that the district court in ProCD found that the 
                                                                                                                          
206 Id. at 78.  Professor Murray suggests that the same result can be achieved over the phone 
through a verbal advisement to the same effect.  Id. at 79. 
207 See id. (“Under this analysis, section 2-207 would have no application unless there was either 
no statement on the package or the statement was inconspicuous.”).  
208 Id. at 78–79.  Murray posits that, in a phone order, an oral warning that terms are coming 
creates a counter-offer for a conditional contract that the buyer would accept if he or she moved 
forward with the contract.  Id. at 79.  This view assumes a court would not view the follow-up terms as 
a confirmation of an oral agreement.  Alternatively, the Murray approach could be viewed as giving 
rise to a preliminary agreement.  See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 27 (1981) 
(“Manifestations of assent that are in themselves sufficient to conclude a contract will not be prevented 
from so operating by the fact that the parties also manifest an intention to prepare and adopt a written 
memorial thereof; but the circumstances may show that the agreements are preliminary negotiations.”).  
As it is not fully enforceable yet, this must envision a preliminary type II agreement, which could 
obligate the parties to negotiate further terms in good faith.  However, as no further negotiations are 
envisioned, it does not seem to be an ideal fit for the fact scenario. 
209 See U.C.C. § 2-207 (2011) (applying to contracts that have “Additional Terms in Acceptance 
or Confirmation”). 
210 See Pioneer Hi-Bred Int’l, Inc. v. Ottawa Plant Food, Inc., 283 F. Supp. 2d 1018, 1046–49 
(N.D. Iowa 2003) (holding that a clause which limited resale of corn seed product that was posted on 
the packaging label was enforceable under section 2-207); Monsanto Co. v. Scruggs, 249 F. Supp. 2d 
746, 754 (N.D. Miss. 2001) (applying section 2-207(2) to a license that was received post-purchase), 
amended by 342 F. Supp. 2d 568 (N.D. Miss. 2004), aff’d in part, vacated in part, 459 F.3d 1328 (Fed. 
Cir. 2006); cf. Album Graphics, Inc. v. Beatrice Foods Co., 408 N.E.2d 1041, 1048 (Ill. App. Ct. 1980) 
(applying section 2-207 when a buyer orally ordered an adhesive and in response, seller sent adhesive 
with additional written terms, but seller admitted such terms were part of a confirmatory memoranda).  
The Murray proposal also raises the possibility that the in-store contract is nothing more than a 
preliminary agreement, which may itself be subject to scrutiny.  See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF 
CONTRACTS § 26 (“A manifestation of willingness to enter into a bargain is not an offer if the person to 
whom it is addressed knows or has reason to know that the person making it does not intend to 
conclude a bargain until he has made a further manifestation of assent.”).  If the effect of the notice 
language is that a contract is formed subject to acceptance of additional terms to be viewed later, it can 
be argued that no contract has been formed at that point at all.  See id. § 21 cmt. b (“Agreement not to 
be legally bound.  Parties to what would otherwise be a bargain and a contract sometimes agree that 
their legal relations are not to be affected. In the absence of any invalidating cause, such a term is 
respected by the law like any other term, but such an agreement may present difficult questions of 
interpretation: it may mean that no bargain has been reached, or that a particular manifestation of 
intention is not a promise; it may reserve a power to revoke or terminate a promise under certain 
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contract was subject to section 2-207 despite the presence of a clause on 
the product itself.211  Furthermore, this assumes that the buyer is actually 
making such an offer.  What may be more likely is that the buyer simply 
believes that he or she is entering into an agreement to buy the product at a 
set price and nothing more.212 
This reluctance to consider the context and nature of the transaction is 
no small matter.  If all a vendor needs to do is place a warning label on its 
products that additional terms are coming, every product will easily be 
subject to a rolling contract approach and section 2-207 will become a dead 
letter as applied to consumers.  But that is not to say such labels are 
irrelevant either.  Certainly, fairness dictates that a buyer should be 
permitted to know that additional terms may apply and are forthcoming 
prior to engaging in the transaction.  Such notice permits the buyer to 
engage, if necessary, in additional inquiry as to the terms.  The problem 
with the Murray and Friedman approaches are that they put an emphasis on 
packaging disclosures, but do not take into account context. 
Having determined that a blind adherence to rolling contract theory 
ignores doctrine and is potentially abusive, it is tempting to simply reject 
the theory.  However, to do so would ignore the perceived benefits such 
standard form contracting may offer.  A middle ground is preferable, and 
though Professor Murray’s approach offers a workable and perhaps 
efficient solution to the doctrinal and fairness problems rolling contracts 
raise, a more nuanced approach that takes into account context could offer 
a workable solution as well.  The remainder of this Article explains how 
contract formation informed by both a legal realist approach and relational 
contract approach may provide courts the flexibility needed to address a 
number of situations moving forward without having to re-write the U.C.C. 
                                                                                                                          
circumstances but not others.  In a written document prepared by one party it may raise a question of 
misrepresentation or mistake or overreaching; to avoid such questions it may be read against the party 
who prepared it.” (second emphasis added)). 
211 ProCD I, 908 F. Supp. 640, 652–55 (W.D. Wis. 1996) (analyzing and applying section 2-207), 
rev’d, ProCD II, 86 F.3d 1447 (7th Cir. 1996). 
212 Friedman himself noted this danger, stating: 
Whether or not the contract is technically consummated at purchase or order, the 
buyer is most fully focused on the transaction at that point.  To consider which terms 
may be deferred without reference to the circumstances of the purchase, as though 
the purchase and deferral of terms are independent of one another, is not 
appropriate. 
Friedman, supra note 28, at 26; cf. Licitra v. Gateway, Inc., 734 N.Y.S.2d 389, 390–92 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 
2001) (interpreting “cash now, terms later” transactions as meaning that “a contract has been formed 
with the price, the equipment and time of delivery agreed to, but almost nothing else” and any 
subsequent terms “should not be enforced merely because the consumer retains the equipment for 30 
days after receipt”). 
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IV.  REHABILITATING THE “ROLLING CONTRACT” 
Before addressing how this approach to contract formation would 
work, it is useful to take a moment to explain how rolling contracts can 
exist without implicating section 2-207.  One of the doctrinal blunders 
from ProCD II and Hill that has been decried repeatedly is the statement 
that section 2-207 does not apply to situations involving only one form.213  
This is blatantly wrong.  Though section 2-207 can apply to a true battle of 
the forms situation, it can also apply to oral contracts with a single written 
confirmation.214  However, it is understandable why Easterbrook would 
want to avoid application of section 2-207. 
If section 2-207 did apply, then the Hill case would likely have come 
down differently.  The contract formed over the phone would be the 
contract, and the terms that followed would be additional terms in a 
confirmation that, as consumers, the Hills could ignore.  ProCD II may 
have been a closer call if Matthew Zeidenberg were a merchant (which 
Easterbrook denied in Hill), as the license agreement would turn on section 
2-207(2)(b) and whether it materially altered the contract.215  Indeed, the 
case could have been decided in ProCD’s favor on this ground, but this 
outcome would deny Easterbrook the ability to put forth the rolling 
contract theory.  Thus, application of section 2-207 was likely seen as a 
danger to future application of the theory (and to the perceived economic 
efficiencies that Easterbrook espoused). 
However, Easterbrook may have been right, but not for the reason he 
articulated.  Easterbrook makes it clear that the offer comes not in the 
store, but when the product goes home.216  To Easterbrook, the offer is the 
writing that comes in the package, which the buyer accepts by 
performance.217  If this is indeed the offer, then Easterbrook is correct in 
saying section 2-207 does not apply.  The reason this is true is that section 
                                                                                                                          
213 See Hill v. Gateway 2000, Inc., 105 F.3d 1147, 1150 (7th Cir. 1997) (“Plaintiffs tell us that 
ProCD came out as it did only because Zeidenberg was a ‘merchant’ and the terms inside ProCD’s box 
were not excluded by the ‘unless’ clause.  This argument pays scant attention to the opinion in ProCD, 
which concluded that, when there is only one form, ‘sec. 2-207 is irrelevant.’” (quoting ProCD II, 86 
F.3d at 1452)); ProCD II, 86 F.3d at 1452 (“Our case has only one form; U.C.C. § 2-207 is 
irrelevant.”). 
214 See W. Indus., Inc. v. Newcor Can. Ltd., 739 F.2d 1198, 1205 (7th Cir. 1984) (“Newcor’s 
formal written quotation was merely a written confirmation, which under the UCC could not alter the 
oral contract materially.” (citing U.C.C. § 2-207(2)(b) (1978))). 
215 See U.C.C. § 2-207(2)(b) (2011) (“Between merchants [additional] terms become part of the 
contract unless . . . they materially alter it.”). 
216 See ProCD II, 86 F.3d at 1452–53 (pointing out that Zeidenberg had an opportunity to review 
the license terms before using the software). 
217 See id. (“Zeidenberg inspected the package, tried out the software, learned of the license, and 
did not reject the goods.”). 
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2-207 does not apply to a written offer with acceptance by performance.218  
Instead, section 2-206 would be the most relevant statute (ironically one 
which Easterbrook did not discuss) and the vendor’s offer could be 
accepted “[u]nless otherwise unambiguously indicated by the language or 
circumstances . . . in any manner and by any medium reasonable in the 
circumstances.”219 
So this turns the real question about rolling contracts into one of 
formulation of the offer.  Is the offer made in the store by the buyer, as 
traditional contract law would treat the situation, or is the offer deferred?  
V.  A LEGAL REALISM/RELATIONAL CONTRACT APPROACH TO OFFER 
Having identified the conceptual base of the doctrinal problem, all that 
remains is to form a framework that solves the riddle of “when is the offer 
made?”  Legal realism, the theory underlying much of the U.C.C. and the 
Restatement, provides a good starting point, but rolling contract theory 
may actually be served, perhaps surprisingly, by the insights provided by 
relational contract theory.  Applying legal realism—as informed by 
relational contract theory’s view of contracts as lying on a spectrum, from 
near-discrete contracts to contracts with complex and ongoing 
obligations—permits courts the flexibility to determine when it is proper to 
place the offer in the store or to defer the offer.  Such an approach can 
explain the ProCD II and Hill decisions without having to distort the 
U.C.C.  However, such an approach should be applied cautiously and with 
a number of limiting caveats, which are sometimes ignored by courts. 
A.  Legal Realism and Contract Law 
Legal realism is largely associated with the work of Arthur Linton 
Corbin and his student Karl Llewellyn.220  This approach to law is 
popularly characterized as rejecting the rigidity of classical contract law.221  
Instead, legal realism proposed to look at contracts within the context of 
                                                                                                                          
218 See U.C.C. § 2-207 (applying only to contracts that have “Additional Terms in Acceptance or 
Confirmation”); cf. JAMES J. WHITE & ROBERT S. SUMMERS, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 
PRACTITIONER TREATISE SERIES 63 (5th ed. 2006) (noting that section 2-207 has no application to a 
situation in which a written acceptance is silent as to additional terms of a buyer’s written offer). 
219 U.C.C. § 2-206. 
220 See Scott D. Gerber, Corbin and Fuller’s Cases on Contracts (1942?): The Casebook that 
Never Was, 72 FORDHAM L. REV. 595, 599 (2003) (describing Corbin as “one of the original legal 
realists”); Charles L. Knapp, Taking Contracts Private: The Quiet Revolution in Contract Law, 71 
FORDHAM L. REV. 761, 768 (2002) (noting Professor Karl Llewellyn’s focus on contract law during the 
legal realism movement). 
221 See Franklin G. Snyder, Clouds of Mystery: Dispelling the Realist Rhetoric of the Uniform 
Commercial Code, 68 OHIO ST. L.J. 11, 14 (“[Llewellyn] wanted to replace . . . the rough-and-tumble 
hard bargaining of classical capitalism.”). 
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the facts of the individual case being decided.222  To the realists, contract 
law was not, and should not be, a cold mechanical application of formal 
rules with little regard for the context within which the contract was made.   
This influence, via Llewellyn, was carried through into the drafting of 
the modern U.C.C. and the Restatement (Second) of Contracts.223  
Specifically, in the U.C.C., Llewellyn sought to bring contract law into line 
with business practices and customs as they operated in real life.224  This 
influence can be seen in provisions such as section 2-202, which permits 
consideration of parol evidence such as course of performance, course of 
dealing, or usage of trade even in a fully integrated contract.225  Similarly, 
section 2-208 of the U.C.C. and section 203 of the Restatement advise that 
course of performance, course of dealing, and trade usage should be used 
in determining the meaning of a contract.226  Section 2-204, which was 
cited approvingly in ProCD II,227 permits a contract to be enforceable—
even if there are terms left open and even if the exact moment of its 
making is undetermined—as long as the parties intended to make a 
contract and there is a reasonably certain basis for giving a remedy.228  
Section 2-206(1)(b) and the “battle of the forms” provision, section 2-207, 
both discussed in Part II, were also seen as enabling courts to apply a set of 
laws that better reflected the true business practices of the parties involved.  
As Frank Snyder has summarized, “[t]he point of the new rules, then, was 
to replace the tired old technicalities of the Formalist era with new rules 
that would better fit modern commercial practice.”229 
The U.C.C. also incorporated a number of provisions with an eye 
toward interactions between consumers and merchants.  Section 2-207 
applies to both consumers and merchants and presumes additional terms 
                                                                                                                          
222 Murray, supra note 18, at 891. 
223 See id. at 878–79 (“Corbin . . . rejected monistic rules and provided a foundation for a modern 
and realistic contracts jurisprudence. . . . The genuine ‘wholly different conception’ of contract law, 
however, occurred a half century ago with the introduction of Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial 
Code, created by Llewellyn, who had been Corbinized by his teacher.”). 
224 Knapp, supra note 220, at 768. 
225 U.C.C. § 2-202 (2011). 
226 Id. § 2-208; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 203 (1981). 
227 See supra text accompanying notes 125–26. 
228 U.C.C. § 2-204; see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 22(2) (“A manifestation 
of mutual assent may be made even though neither offer nor acceptance can be identified and even 
though the moment of formation cannot be determined.”). 
229 Snyder, supra note 221, at 23.  Professor Snyder actually makes a compelling case in his 
article that Llewellyn’s U.C.C., in fact, does not reflect legal realism, but rather Llewellyn’s own 
personal value norms.  See id. at 13 (“[A] look at what Llewellyn actually wrought suggests that, for 
him, the proper relationship between theory and doctrine is to use whichever one gives him the result 
he wants in a given situation.”).  Snyder refers to the legal realism that is purported to be influencing 
the U.C.C. as “Pop Realism.”  Id. at 19. 
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are not a part of contracts formed under section 2-207(1).230  But perhaps 
the most consumer-oriented provision incorporated into both the U.C.C. 
and the Restatement (Second) of Contracts is the unconscionability 
provision.231  Worded in nearly identical terms, these provisions permit 
reviewing courts to void or reform contract provisions that are viewed as 
unconscionable under the circumstances.232  The unconscionability 
determination, in line with the legal realists’ call for consideration of 
context, is to be made in light of the surrounding circumstances.233  The 
test for unconscionability under the comments to the U.C.C. reads as 
follows: 
[W]hether, in the light of the general commercial background 
and the commercial needs of the particular trade or case, the 
clauses involved are so one-sided as to be unconscionable 
under the circumstances existing at the time of the making of 
the contract. . . . The principle is one of the prevention of 
oppression and unfair surprise and not of disturbance of 
allocation of risks because of superior bargaining power.234 
Most courts apply Professor Arthur Leff’s framework, which provides 
that unconscionability can be either procedural or substantive, with many 
courts requiring a showing of both.235  A number of courts have applied 
unconscionability doctrine to boilerplate terms, such as those found in a 
rolling contract, and granted relief to plaintiffs under this provision. 
Though boilerplate is often dealt with under the unconscionabilty 
provisions, the Restatement addresses the subject head-on.  Section 211 
states: 
(1) Except as stated in Subsection (3), where a party to an 
agreement signs or otherwise manifests assent to a writing 
and has reason to believe that like writings are regularly used 
to embody terms of agreements of the same type, he adopts 
the writing as an integrated agreement with respect to the 
terms included in the writing. 
                                                                                                                          
230 See U.C.C. § 2-207 (“[A]dditional terms are to be construed as proposals for addition to the 
contract.”). 
231 Id. § 2-302; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 208.  Unconscionability is not 
necessarily limited to consumers, but consumers are generally more likely to benefit from these 
provisions than merchants. 
232 U.C.C. § 2-302 & cmt. 1; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) CONTRACTS § 208 & cmt. a. 
233 U.C.C. § 2-302(2) & cmt. 1; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 208 & cmt. a; see 
Murray, supra note 18, at 887–89 (“[Llewellyn] designed [the unconscionability provision] exclusively 
as a device that would empower courts to assure a more precise and fair determination of the factual 
bargain.”). 
234 U.C.C. § 2-302 cmt. 1 (citation omitted). 
235 See Arthur Leff, Unconscionability and the Code—The Emperor’s New Clause, 115 U. PA. L. 
REV. 485, 488 (1967) (discussing procedural and substantive unconscionability). 
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(2) Such a writing is interpreted wherever reasonable as 
treating alike all those similarly situated, without regard to 
their knowledge or understanding of the standard terms of the 
writing. 
(3) Where the other party has reason to believe that the party 
manifesting such assent would not do so if he knew that the 
writing contained a particular term, the term is not part of the 
agreement.236 
This provision acknowledges the problem of standard term agreements and 
assent and applies a type of “blanket assent” to all such terms in the 
writing, subject to the caveat listed in subsection three.237   
Comment f to section 211 clarifies that “[a]lthough customers typically 
adhere to standardized agreements and are bound by them without even 
appearing to know the standard terms in detail, they are not bound to 
unknown terms which are beyond the range of reasonable expectation.”238  
Interestingly, the comments also address a situation common in rolling 
contracts—terms appearing on instructions of use and the like.  Comment d 
states: 
The same document may serve both contractual and other 
purposes, and a party may assent to it for other purposes 
without understanding that it embodies contract terms.  He 
may nevertheless be bound if he has reason to know that it is 
used to embody contract terms.  Insurance policies, 
steamship tickets, bills of lading, and warehouse receipts are 
commonly so obviously contractual in form as to give the 
customer reason to know their character.  But baggage 
checks or automobile parking lot tickets may appear to be 
mere identification tokens, and a party without knowledge or 
reason to know that the token purports to be a contract is then 
not bound by terms printed on the token.  Documents such as 
invoices, instructions for use, and the like, delivered after a 
contract is made, may raise similar problems.239 
The comment advises that the individual’s situation, as viewed through 
objective reasonableness or subjective knowledge, should be taken into 
account.  Thus, as with unconscionability, Llewellyn’s legal realism calls 
                                                                                                                          
236 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 211. 
237 Id. § 211 cmt. c; LLEWELLYN, supra note 13, at 370; see also Hillman, supra note 13, at 750 
(“Llewellyn’s conception of ‘blanket assent’ is better read to mean only that, despite failing to read 
form contracts, users comprehend the existence of standard terms and agree to bind themselves to them, 
provided the terms are not unreasonable.”). 
238 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 211 cmt. f. 
239 Id. § 211 cmt. d (emphasis added). 
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for consideration of the context of the contract. 
B.  Relational Contract Theory 
Relational contract theory is the life’s work of Professor Ian R. 
Macneil.240  Under Macneil’s view of contract law, contracts are 
relationships and not discrete, isolated interactions.241  In one of his latest 
works, Macneil summarized relational contract theory as having four core 
propositions: 
First, every transaction is embedded in complex relations. 
Second, understanding any transaction requires 
understanding all essential elements of its enveloping 
relations. 
Third, effective analysis of any transaction requires 
recognition and consideration of all essential elements of its 
enveloping relations that might affect the transaction 
significantly. 
Fourth, combined contextual analysis of relations and 
transactions is more efficient and produces a more complete 
and sure final analytical product than does commencing with 
non-contextual analysis of transactions.242 
With this focus on relationships, relational contract theory rejects 
classic formulations of offer and acceptance as inaccurate.243  Stewart 
Macaulay has recounted an analogy to explain the relational approach: 
Often, however, in a long-term continuing relationship, the 
situation resembles a rheostat.  As more and more power is 
sent to the bulb, we get more and more light.  It is hard to say 
when the light has been turned on.  On and off are not useful 
terms.  Similarly, in a relational contract often it is hard to 
say when the contract is formed.  Moreover, it is not likely to 
be formed once and for all.244 
An important aspect of relational contract theory worth noting is that it 
divides contracts into two ends on a spectrum with discrete contracts at one 
                                                                                                                          
240 Murray, supra note 18, at 877. 
241 Stewart Macaulay, Relational Contracts Floating on a Sea of Custom? Thoughts About the 
Ideas of Ian MacNeil and Lisa Bernstein, 94 NW. U. L. REV. 775, 801 (2000); Macneil, supra note 23, 
at 878; Murray, supra note 18, at 877. 
242 Macneil, supra note 23, at 881–82 (footnotes omitted). 
243 See Macaulay, supra note 241, at 778 (“Macneil . . . points out that our assumed story about 
making contracts often fits the facts poorly.” (citing Ian R. Macneil, Restatement (Second) of Contracts 
and Presentiation, 60 VA. L. REV. 589 (1974))). 
244 Id. (crediting Macneil as the genesis of the analogy). 
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end and relational ones at the other.245  The discrete describes a simple sale 
such as an exchange of goods.246  However, Macneil admits that even 
discrete contracts have some relational aspects, so the idea of a purely 
discrete contract is a fiction.247  He therefore labels such transactions “as-
if-discrete.”248  Running from as-if-discrete relations, contracts increase in 
complexity to the highly relational.  Macneil lists a number of factors to be 
considered in determining where a contractual relation should lie on the 
spectrum, including the personal relations of the parties; the number of 
parties involved; the subject of the exchange; the commencement, duration 
and termination of relationship; planning; and future cooperation.249 
Perhaps it should come as no surprise that relational contract theory is 
critical of the rules formed by the legal realists as mere tweaks to the prior 
formalistic regime.250  Macneil has asserted that though neoclassical law 
can deal adequately with discrete contracts, when discrete and relational 
principles conflict, neoclassical law lacks the resources necessary to deal 
adequately with the problem.251  However, while relational contract theory 
asserts itself as a stand-alone theory, neoclassicists view the theory as just 
a subset of legal realism.252  This Article does not attempt to resolve that 
debate, but simply recognizes what relational contract theory could add to 
our understanding of offer under a neoclassical framework. 
C.  A Legal Realism/Relational Approach to Offer 
In reviewing the principles of legal realism, it appears that the rules 
promulgated were meant to be flexible enough to deal with both changing 
and evolving commercial practices.  The many provisions cited in both the 
U.C.C. and Restatement focus on the context within which the contract 
before the court was made.  Unfortunately, due to the way the sections 
                                                                                                                          
245 Macneil, supra note 23, at 894; see IAN R. MACNEIL, THE NEW SOCIAL CONTRACT: AN 
INQUIRY INTO MODERN CONTRACTUAL RELATIONS 10 (1980) [hereinafter MACNEIL, SOCIAL 
CONTRACT] (delineating two types of relational contracts: the primitive community contractual relation 
and the modern contractual relation). 
246 MACNEIL, SOCIAL CONTRACT, supra note 245, at 10.  
247 Id.; Macneil, supra note 23, at 895. 
248 Macneil, supra note 23, at 895. 
249 MACNEIL, SOCIAL CONTRACT, supra note 245, at 13–20.  Macneil lists a total of eleven such 
factors.  These factors were put forth in relation to the primitive community relational contract, but 
Macneil later stresses that they are all relevant to the modern contractual relation as well.  Id. at 21.   
250 See id. at 72–77 (criticizing U.C.C. section 2-207’s failure to address relations); Murray, supra 
note 18, at 877 (“Advocates of relational theory assert that the neoclassical school simply absorbs the 
theory, pretending that it is neither revolutionary nor radical but simply an extension of neoclassical 
truth.”). 
251 MACNEIL, SOCIAL CONTRACT, supra note 245, at 72. 
252 Murray, supra note 18, at 877–78; see Melvin A. Eisenberg, Why There Is No Law of 
Relational Contracts, 94 NW. U. L. REV. 805, 817–20 (2000) (“There can be no special law of 
relational contracts, because relational contracts and contracts are virtually one and the same.”). 
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have been written and the way they have been applied, many situations are 
bound to a rather mechanical offer and acceptance model.  This presents 
problems for the rolling contract, which, as explained in Part IV, needs to 
displace the typical offer model if it is to avoid section 2-207 and survive.  
Unfortunately, the U.C.C. does not address how to differentiate between 
two possible offers, thus creating a problem when our consumer enters a 
store, walks up to the counter with a package of software, and pays.  The 
problem presents just the sort of situation Macneil suggested neoclassical 
rules were inadequate to address—a discrete contract with relational 
aspects.  Therefore, it would appear apropos to utilize the relational 
concept of the discrete/relational spectrum as a means of resolving the 
issue. 
A legal realist view of offer would require an examination of the 
circumstances under which the parties transacted.  The notice, both on the 
package and perhaps elsewhere, would help determine which is the offer.  
But a relational approach would further inquire into the nature of the 
contract being contemplated.  What is the nature of the product?  Do the 
parties expect to have further interaction?  Will the seller provide ongoing 
technical support and if so, for how long?  Is the buyer aware of such 
additional services when the product is bought?  Was the transaction part 
of a larger negotiation?  All of these questions would be relevant in 
determining the nature of the transaction.253 
At this point, it should be clarified that this is not a relational approach 
to offer.  Relational theorists would likely cringe at the suggestion that the 
approach could be used to support a deferred offer that began the 
contractual relationship like a light switch.254  However, under a legal 
realism approach to offer that is informed by the relational contract theory, 
the nature of the relationship, and whether it is fair that the parties expected 
a further communication as the formal offer, is perhaps the best way to 
view and justify the rolling contract.255  The more discrete a transaction is, 
the more likely it is that the traditional offer and acceptance model should 
apply.  Transactions that envision ongoing services may very well be 
understood to involve more than a simple in-store payment and thus justify 
                                                                                                                          
253 MACNEIL, SOCIAL CONTRACT, supra note 245, at 13–20; see Rogers v. Dell Computer Corp., 
138 P.3d 826, 832 (Okla. 2005) (“In this case, the time of formation of the contracts and their terms 
depend on the conversations and circumstances between Dell and the plaintiffs at the time the orders 
were placed.  If the language and circumstances were such that when the orders were placed, the 
contracts were not formed until after the plaintiffs received the ‘Terms and Conditions of Sale’ 
document, the arbitration provisions would be a term of the contracts.  The arbitration provision would 
also be a term of the contracts if it were incorporated into them at the time the plaintiffs placed the 
orders.”). 
254 See Macaulay, supra note 241, at 778 (describing the light switch analogy). 
255 See Murray, supra note 18, at 906 (“Ironically, this ‘rolling’ or ‘layered’ contract theory may 
be viewed as ‘relational’ though the true relationist would reject any such characterization as 
heretical.”). 
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delaying the offer. 
This is not to say that every sale of goods that has an ongoing 
relational aspect is now subject to rolling contract treatment.  As the 
relationists have admitted, no contract is purely discrete.  The fact that 
implied warranties may apply should not transform an otherwise discrete 
transaction into a relational one.  Both parties must also be aware of the 
nature of the relationship.256  In this regard, notice, such as described by 
either Friedman or Murray, will be highly relevant in analyzing when the 
offer occurs.257 
To understand how this approach might apply, consider the facts of 
ProCD II.  Zeidenberg was, in fact, somewhat of a villain.258  He had 
purchased software from ProCD before and was aware that the software 
would be subject to some sort of license agreement.259  The software 
package warned him on the box that the software was subject to a 
license.260  He also knew that the software simply permitted him to access 
the ProCD database, which was unquestionably in the nature of an ongoing 
relationship.261  The contract was, therefore, not a discrete (or as-if-
discrete) transaction, but one that contemplated an ongoing relationship.  
Given the circumstances, it was perfectly reasonable to assume Zeidenberg 
knew his in-store purchase was not the end of the deal, but the beginning, 
and that contract terms, i.e. the offer, would be forthcoming.  Indeed, all of 
the examples provided by Easterbrook in his opinion that purport to be in 
the nature of rolling contracts (insurance agreements, airline tickets, and 
concert tickets) are more than discrete relationships.262 
                                                                                                                          
256 Macneil addresses this somewhat in the factor of attitudes.  The collection of attitudes of the 
parties that the participants have towards the transaction is a relevant factor and takes into account 
attitudes regarding conflict of interest, unity, time, and expectations about trouble.  MACNEIL, SOCIAL 
CONTRACT, supra note 245, at 17–20. 
257 See supra Part III.C (presenting Friedman and Murray’s suggestions concerning notice). 
258 See James J. White, Contracting Under Amended 2-207, 2004 WIS. L. REV. 723, 741 
(“Zeidenberg was surely a naughty fellow who should have his hands slapped.”). 
259 ProCD II, 86 F.3d 1447, 1450 (7th Cir. 1996). 
260 Id. 
261 Id. at 1449. 
262 Id. at 1451.  This approach would also help to explain the result in Mortenson, discussed in 
Part III.B.  In Mortenson, the buyer had been using the seller’s software for three years before 
purchasing the updated software at issue.  M.A. Mortenson Co. v. Timberline Software Corp., 998 P.2d 
305, 307 (Wash. 2000) (en banc).  There was evidence that Mortenson had been operating under the 
license agreement at issue during this time so there was an awareness of the license, even if the 
purchase order made no mention of it.  Id. at 312.  Also, the purchase order at issue had ongoing 
relational aspects such as “software support” for an unspecified number of hours, which would have 
put both parties on notice that further terms would be forthcoming.  Id. at 311.  Hill is a more difficult 
case to justify, but it can still be resolved under the legal realist/relational approach to offer.  
Easterbrook’s references to the ongoing technical support that the purchasers were receiving tends to 
lend credence to the transaction being more than a discrete relationship; the failure to give notice on the 
box, however, that terms were coming raises questions of whether the buyers would really have known 
about the support and warranties.  See Hill v. Gateway 2000, Inc., 105 F.3d 1147, 1150 (7th Cir. 1997) 
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D.  A Cautious Approach to the Rolling Contract 
While this approach may be useful for resolving the issue of 
identifying when an offer can be deferred, a cautious approach should be 
taken lest every vendor attempt, through boilerplate language and standard 
warranties, to turn discrete contracts into relational ones.  First, for a sale 
of goods, the presumption should be that the basic rule applies and the 
offer occurs in-store by the purchaser.  It should be up to the vendor to 
rebut this presumption, which it can do by showing either that the buyer 
subjectively knew that the offer was coming, or, based on the 
circumstances, it was objectively reasonable to assume that the offer was 
coming.263  It is in this second method that the legal realism/relational 
approach will be useful.  In assessing reasonableness, courts should 
consider the language on the product, such as notices of additional terms, 
as well as the nature of the contract contemplated.  The closer a transaction 
comes to a discrete transaction, the less likely it is that an ongoing 
relationship is contemplated by both parties.  It may be that in some 
circumstances, the nature of the contract contemplated requires little in the 
way of product labeling because the contract clearly is not a discrete one.  
In other circumstances, the labeling may be of higher importance, as the 
ongoing nature of the relationship may not be readily apparent to the 
buyer.  Either way, the labeling or notice used should not necessarily be 
the determining factor, but should be instructive on the nature of the 
contractual relationship.  Finally, the terms of the deferred offer should be 
related to the nature of the ongoing relationship so that the buyer will have 
notice of their existence, if not their details, prior to making the purchasing 
decision. 
Under a rolling contract theory, if the contract offer is deferred, then 
the limitations described in Part III.B, should still be followed.  The terms 
should be conspicuous and should describe how the purchaser can reject 
the offer.264  Furthermore, in keeping with section 69 of the Restatement 
(Second) of Contracts, silence or inaction should not be the proscribed 
                                                                                                                          
(describing the difference as “functional, not legal”).  These issues should have been explored further 
under the legal realism/relational approach.  See Friedman, supra note 28, at 9 (criticizing the Hill 
court’s conclusion regarding the buyers’ ability to obtain the terms ahead of time as “a bit 
underwhelming” because of the buyers’ lack of awareness that additional terms existed). 
263 See Rogers v. Dell Computer Corp., 138 P.3d 826, 832 (Okla. 2005) (“Under section 2-206(1) 
of the U.C.C., the buyer is the offeror, and a contract is formed when an order is placed and the seller 
agrees to ship unless the language and circumstances involved in the transaction unambiguously show 
otherwise.”). 
264 See DeFontes v. Dell, Inc., 984 A.2d 1061, 1071–72 (R.I. 2009) (holding that consumers were 
not bound by deferred terms when it was not reasonably apparent that they could reject the terms 
simply by returning the goods). 
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mode of acceptance, though the simple use of the product should suffice.265  
Also, in keeping with section 211 of the Restatement, the deferred offer 
should not be incorporated into a user’s manual or the like, but instead 
should clearly identify itself as the contract terms.266 
Finally, given that the buyer has the product and the vendor has the 
buyer’s money before the buyer even gets to realistically see the detailed 
terms, such contracts go beyond mere “contracts of adhesion.”267  There is 
an added level of procedural gamesmanship when the only way to reject an 
offer is to travel back to a store or to pay for shipping the product back.268  
To the degree that such rolling contracts engage in this sort of 
gamesmanship, courts should not be reluctant to find procedural 
unconscionability, thus lessening the burden of the buyer/plaintiff should 
the contract also contain onerous terms.269 
                                                                                                                          
265 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 69 (1981).  Section 69 provides that silence or 
inaction can only act as an acceptance in specified circumstances, such as when the “offeree takes the 
benefit of offered services with reasonable opportunity to reject them and reason to know that they 
were offered with the expectation of compensation,” or “an offeree . . . does any act inconsistent with 
the offeror’s ownership.”  Id.  But see Rogers, 138 P.3d at 833 (“The plaintiffs’ accepting the 
computers and not returning them is consistent with a contract being formed at the time that the orders 
were placed and cannot be construed as acquiescing in the ‘Terms and Conditions of Sale’ document 
whether included with the invoice or acknowledgment or with the computer packaging.”); Gillette, 
supra note 10, at 681 (“Assent typically reflects some arrangement to which there has been mutual 
agreement created by negotiations or conduct more explicit than opening a box or using a product that 
is accompanied (unknown to or ignored by the user) by a recitation of obligations.”); White, supra note 
258, at 737 (“To say that the offeror is the ‘master of his offer’ means only that he may rule out certain 
things as acceptance.  That is, he can limit the universe of things that will be regarded as acceptances, 
not that he can expand acceptance beyond the universe that a reasonable person in the offeree’s shoes 
would believe to be acceptance.”). 
266 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 211 & cmt. d. 
267 See Russell Korobkin, Bounded Rationality, Standard Form Contracts, and Unconscionability, 
70 U. CHI. L. REV. 1203, 1265 (2003) (discussing ProCD II and Hill as examples of “situation-specific 
monopolies,” in which the sellers can take advantage of the fact that the purchase already occurred not 
by raising the price but by providing terms of low quality).  Unfortunately, a number of courts that have 
adopted the rolling contract approach have been content to simply cite to the widespread use and 
efficiency of such deferred terms as well as to rely on the conspicuousness of the terms themselves 
rather than on the procedural unconscionability of deferring such terms in the first place.  See 
Friedman, supra note 28, at 38 (noting that there was no real discussion in Mortenson of whether the 
deferral itself was unconscionable).  This Article agrees with Professor Friedman that such a limited 
analysis is insufficient. 
268 White, supra note 258, at 748.  Professor White presents a humorous visual to illustrate his 
point regarding such deferred offers: 
The buyer has received and spent all evening setting up his computer, and he is 
sitting in his study in International Falls, Minnesota, in his underwear with a beer 
when he has to decide whether to agree to the new terms or go out in the negative-
thirty-degree temperature and return the computer.  This offer is more objectionable 
than a predelivery e-mail because it is coercive. 
Id. 
269 See Friedman, supra note 28, at 35–40 (asserting that, absent template notice, deferred terms 
are more susceptible to unconscionability attacks even with only a small degree of substantive 
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VI.  CONCLUSION 
Rolling contracts have indeed become commonplace in many 
transactions.  However, this does not mean that all such contracts are 
sinister or should be abhorred.  The ability to read terms later in the 
convenience of one’s own home may indeed appeal to a buying consumer.  
But caution must be exercised to ensure that the buyer has actually 
anticipated such an arrangement.  If the buyer has, then a rule that strikes 
such contracts down under a mechanical approach to the U.C.C. interferes 
with the parties’ expectations and freedom to contract.  However, a rule 
that upholds rolling contracts, with little regard for the context of the 
transaction, similarly defeats freedom of contract by imposing additional 
terms upon buyers without considering the bargained exchange that was 
expected. 
The U.C.C. and the legal realism movement that is at the heart of many 
of its provisions should reject such mechanical applications in either 
direction.  A legal realism/relational approach to when an offer is made 
takes into account the context and expectations of the parties.  This 
approach, coupled with protections, such as conspicuous terms and the 
unconscionability doctrine, should ensure a proper balance between the 
efficiency of rolling contracts and protection from overreaching by 
vendors.  Discrete contracts will continue to enjoy a presumption of the 
traditional contract formation rules, but will be displaced where 
reasonable.  This approach gives courts the flexibility to take account for, 
and give credence to, the rolling contract without casting aside decades of 
contract law or the reasonable expectations of the parties involved. 
                                                                                                                          
unconscionability present).  Professor James Gibson has advocated a similar approach in which the 
entire transaction, from start to finish, should be considered in the procedural unconscionability 
analysis.  James Gibson, Vertical Boilerplate, 70 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 161, 219–20 (2013).  Professor 
Gibson found, in an empirical study of contracts in the desktop computer industry, that the average 
transaction bound the buyer to twenty-five different contracts totaling 74,897 words.  Id. at 190.  As 
part of a judicial response to such contracts, he urges that “courts must look beyond the four corners of 
the contract itself and consider the entire transaction from start to finish with all of its information 
costs.”  Id. at 219–20.  Professor Gibson explains that “[a] term may be unresponsive to market forces, 
notwithstanding its prominence, if it arrives after the consumer has invested considerable time in the 
purchase (the acquisition cost issue) or has concentrated his or her limited attention on other product 
features (the processing cost issue).”  Id. at 220. 
